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I. INTRODUCTION
In the frenzied days and weeks following September 11th many observers called for 
serious consideration of a national identity system whose centerpiece would be some form of 
national identity card.  Such a system was seen mainly as a tool against terrorists, but also as a 
useful response to illegal immigration, identity theft, and electoral fraud.   As yet, no member of 
Congress has introduced legislation to establish a formal national identity system or require a 
national identity card,1 and the “war on terrorism” has turned to other concerns.  Nevertheless, 
the past two years have seen the most serious and detailed consideration of a national identity 
1
 Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “National ID Card Proposals by Another Name”  “Does America Need a National 
Identifier?” at 114, 118
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system in a generation,2 and we are probably just one domestic terror attack away from its 
implementation in some form.3
A national identity system raises a host of policy and legal issues.  Among the former, the 
most important issue is what the purpose of such a system would be and whether it would be 
worth the inevitable financial and social costs.  The answer to that question would help 
determine such subsidiary questions as who would be required to carry an identity card, what 
data would be linked to the card, who would have access to that data, and what uses would be 
made of it.  There are many possible “national identity systems” and myriad kinds and uses of a 
national identity card. 
Scholarly and popular commentary on the possibility of national identity cards has tended 
to focus on their effect on individual privacy, or, as some have put it, the right to anonymity.  
Obviously, this is an extremely important issue, because a national identity card has the potential 
to alter some fundamental aspects of American life. It would undoubtedly enhance governmental 
access to information about each person’s activities, interests, and contacts.  Imposing identity 
checks would in all likelihood vastly increase the frequency of interactions with government 
agents.  Although the possible Fourth and Fifth Amendment ramifications of a national identity 
system have often been acknowledged, they have not been explored in any great depth.4  While 
the impact on these constitutional rights would of course depend on the particular features of the 
2
 See e.g. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTAND THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE 
CHALLENGE 200-201 (2002) (a national identity card is “an issue that deserves careful consideration”); The Century 
Foundation Homeland Security Project, The Debate Over a National Identification Card 1 (2003) (“[P]roposals for 
creating a national identification card have gained new attention.”).  See also, id. at 8-9 (listing proposals for 
enhancements to identity documents and identification requirements).
3
 The Century Foundation Homeland Security Project, The Debate Over a National Identification Card 10 
(2003)(“[I]t is likely that some sort of more extensive identification system will eventually be established in the 
United States”).
4
 Computer Science and Telecommunications, National Research Council, IDs – Not That Easy 7 (200!) (“Clearly, 
an examination of the legal . . .  framework surround identity systems . . . would be essential.”)
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system, because of their centrality to any likely national identity system it is worth examining 
these issues even in the absence of a concrete proposal.5
Part II of this Article describes the features of a national identity system which most 
observers regard as essential.  The main point of identity checking is to make a connection 
between the identified individual and a collection of data. To be effective, a national identity 
system would therefore need to insist that people provide identification at certain times or places.  
This would almost certainly produce new interactions between the populace and law 
enforcement personnel – a subject regulated by the Fourth Amendment only when it amounts to 
a seizure of the person.  One Fourth Amendment question, then, concerns the occasions on which 
state agents could demand to see a person’s identity card.  As the law stands now, the police may 
request to see identification of anyone at any time, in a so-called consensual encounter that does 
not involve seizure of the individual.  On the other hand, the demand to see identification usually 
turns the encounter into an investigative detention, which generally requires that the police have 
reasonable suspicion of criminality.  In addition, however, the Supreme Court has approved the 
use of suspicionless identification checkpoint stops for certain purposes like border control. 
The creation of a duty to carry and present identification at certain times would 
presumably take place against this background, while moving some of these doctrines into new 
territory.  Could, for example, every person subjected to an investigative stop be compelled, on 
pain of prosecution, to show identification?  If so, would a national identity system create an 
incentive to make more stops, particularly for moving violations. When could compulsory 
identity checkpoints be sustained under the Fourth Amendment administrative search rationale?  
5
 NRC Report, supra note 4, at 29 (“The constitutional limitations on an agent’s ability to require presentation of IDs 
. . . should be explored before any such enactment to avert the costs of imposing the system and then having to 
revise or abandon it in the face of its unconstitutionality, to say nothing of its effects on civil liberties.”
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Moreover, would there be Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objections to any of these 
identification requirements?  Part III addresses the constitutional questions raised by 
governmental demands, in a number of contexts, that a person present her identity card.
An identity check can generate new data as well as draw on existing databases.  The 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments are also potentially implicated by the surveillance and monitoring 
of a person’s movement and activities through such data collection and retention. This is 
particularly true of governmental collection of data generated in circumstances in which there 
might otherwise be some legitimate expectation of privacy, such as information provided to 
health care or educational institutions or in other registration procedures.  Would this be a search 
under the Fourth Amendment and, if so, would it be a reasonable one.  As to more public 
encounters, law enforcement personnel may generally observe a person while she is in a public 
place, and may even use common technological aids to do so.  So some data collection attendant 
on identity checks would seem exempt from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  Would the national 
identity system’s frequent and thorough monitoring of movement and activities be so unlike 
more common police surveillance, though, that it constitutes a search and is therefore regulated 
by the Fourth Amendment?  If so, at the very least it could not be done as a matter of course.  A 
potential source of compelled self-incrimination inheres in this data generating aspect of a 
national identity system:  the requirement that certain self-reported information be conveyed to 
official databanks.   Part IV explores the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised in the 
potential data collection and retention features of a national identity system.
This Article is not concerned with the efficacy of a national identification system or 
whether its benefits, however measured, would outweigh its costs – in other words, whether it is 
a “good idea.”  The findings of this Article are not completely divorced from that question, 
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however.  As this Article will demonstrate, to some degree the Fourth Amendment will reduce 
the potential benefits of a national identification system by standing in the way of practices that 
system might otherwise employ.  In particular, random identification stops would fly in the face 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  “Terrorist” profiling checkpoints probably do not pass 
Fourth Amendment muster, either, though they might in certain circumstances.  Identification 
demands in the course of registration procedures, traffic or investigative stops, or arrests, 
however, are all acceptable. Nor does the Fourth Amendment stand in the way of requesting –
rather than demanding -- identification of any person at any time.  On the information gathering 
side of the process, there are substantial Fourth Amendment questions raised by mandated 
reporting of personal information that people produce in the course of everyday life. Though this 
practice should be regarded as a search, it may not be an unreasonable one, up to a point.  In 
contrast to the substantial questions that arise under Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment 
presents little serious obstacle to the most probable national identity system practices.  
Whether all of this leaves the glass of a national identity card half full or half empty 
depends on one’s perspective.  What is fairly clear is that while the constitution might bar certain 
practices, and block others depending on their purpose, it would be possible to have a 
constitutional national identity card system of a fairly comprehensive type. Even where such an 
identity system would not strictly run afoul of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, an analysis of 
the interests those provisions are designed to protect provides an insight into the price in privacy 
and liberty a national identity card would exact.  This Article will also indicate how these effects 
might be somewhat mitigated in the system’s design.  In that sense, this Article hopes to 
illuminate not only what kind of national identity system the U.S. lawfully could have, but how it 
might be designed, and, implicitly, whether we want to have one at all.
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II. FUNCTIONS AND FEATURES OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY SYSTEM 
A. Generally
The basic function of a national identity system would be “to link a stream of data with a 
person.”6   “[H]uman identification is the association of data with a particular human being.”7
Once that connection is made, official reaction can take a variety of forms, depending of course 
on what the data show and the legal consequences of that knowledge.  Our current database of 
outstanding arrest warrants,8 for example, authorizes the arrest of the individual linked with such 
information.9  In protecting against terrorists, in general once the link between an individual and 
a certain record was established, the aim would be that “[i]f there were risk factors, the 
appropriate measure could be taken to ensure safety.”10  In a similar way, the association 
between a given person and a body of data can be used for purposes other than crime prevention 
and enforcement.  A national identity system, it has been suggested, can “aid in fraud prevention 
(for example, in the administration of public benefits), catch ‘deadbeat dads,’ enable electoral 
reforms, allow quick background checks for those buying guns or other monitored items, and 
prevent illegal aliens from working in the United States.”11
Any such system depends on two major features:  the database (or databases) containing 
information about particular individuals and a means to connect a given person with that 
6
  Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,” 
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 8 (1994).
7
   Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,” 
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 8 (1994). 
8 Cite needed
9
 See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to a search resulting 
from the arrest of a suspect erroneously listed in a database as having an outstanding arrest warrant).
10
 Sobel, Demeaning, at 334.  See also, statement of Tim Hoescht, Oracle, , “Does America Need a National 
Identifier?” at 140,  141-42.
11
 NRC, supra note 1, at 6.
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information.12  One way to store information about a person is on a card or other physical token 
in human readable or machine-readable form.13  Alternatively, information may be stored in 
computer databases elsewhere, in which case there will likely be points in time at which 
information about the individual would be accessed, or input, or both.  “[A] card would likely be 
one component of a large and complex nationwide identity system, the core of which could be a 
database of personal information on the U.S. population.”14  What data to collect, who would 
have access to that data, and what uses would be made of it are major issues in the design of any 
prospective national identity system.15   As is discussed below, these decisions will directly 
affect the degree to which the system creates searches or seizures in the Fourth Amendment 
sense.  
In addition to this information cache, any national identity system must have a means of 
establishing identity, in the sense of recognizing an individual as being a specified person.  
Roger Clarke has produced a thorough review of the various means of identifying a person in 
order to associate data with that person.  These include appearance, social behavior, names, 
12
 This is no easy task.  For an indication of some of how much work would need to be done to construct a standard 
national database, see Government Accounting Office, Terrorist Watch Lists Should be Consolidated to Promote 
Better Integration and Sharing, GAO-03-322 (April 15, 2003) at 1-2  (“Generally, the federal government’s 
approach to developing and using terrorist and criminal watch lists in performing its border security mission is 
diffuse and nonstandard, largely because these lists were developed and have evolved in response to individual 
agencies’ unique mission needs and the agencies’ respective legal, cultural, and technological environments.”);  
Government Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa 
Revocation Process, GAO-03-798 (June 2003).  In September 2003 the federal government established a new 
Terrorist Screening Center, to consolidate terrorist watchlists and used the results in screening by consuls, border 
agents, and other federal officials, as well as some private industries.  Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/Hspd-6 (September 16, 2003) reprinted in 80 Interpreter Releases 1322 (September 22, 2003); Dan Eggen, 
Plan for Counterterror Database Unveiled, WASH POST A02  (September 17, 2003). 
13
 NRC, supra note 1, at 22.
14
 NRC at 5.
15
 See NRC, supra note 1, at 22-28. 
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codes, knowledge, tokens, bio-dynamics, natural physiology, and imposed physical 
characteristics.16
In any potential national identity system codes, tokens, and physiology – or some 
combination of all three – will likely be the most important means of identification.  Codes are 
usually a set of numbers, such as the Social Security number.  Their major advantages over 
names are that they are unique, they do not change, and their issuance can be controlled.17  A 
“token” is a tangible item that a person has in his or her possession.  These are often documents, 
though they do not have to be; “memory” or “smart” cards with encoded data can also serve as 
identity tokens.  Documentary tokens currently in common use include birth certificates, 
passports, drivers’ licenses, and social security cards.18
Biometrics are identification techniques based on some unique physiological and 
difficult-to-alienate characteristic.19   Current forms of identification often rely on such relatively 
primitive biometrics as skin, hair, and eye color, physical markings, gender, and facial hair. 
16
 Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues, 7 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PEOPLE, No. 4, 6, 10 (1994).  Clarke gives an interesting account  and capsule 
history of each.  He also gives the following shorthand summary:
1. appearance – or how the person looks;
2. social behaviour – or how the person interacts with others;
3. names – or what the person is called by other people;
4. codes – or what the person is called by an organization;
5. knowledge – or what the person knows;
6. tokens – or what the person has;
7. bio-dynamics – or what the person does;
8. natural physiography – or what the person is;
9. imposed physical characteristics – or what the person is now.
17
 Clarke, supra note 16, at 13.
18
 For a detailed specification of documents establishing employment authorization and identity for purposes of 
verifying authorization to work in the U.S., see Immigration and Nationality Act §274A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. 
§1324a(b)(1) (identity established by U.S. passport, resident alien card, driver’s license).
19
 Clarke, supra note 16, at 17.
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These are often portrayed in a photograph or list of physical characteristics, as, for example, on a 
driver’s license. More discriminating physiological features that can also be used to establish 
identity include fingerprints, DNA patterns, and iris patterns.20  Such biometrics serve to link the 
token on which the biometric information is contained to the person to whom it is supposed to 
relate.21  Biometrics can also be associated directly from the person to the identification, as with 
computerized face recognition or iris scans.22
Codes and biometrics can be combined on a token, and present-day engineering can make 
this token hard to duplicate.  The National Research Council Committee on Authentication 
Technologies and Their Privacy Implications has sketched out one example.23  Another proposal 
made, and retracted, recently includes an enhanced and standardized state drivers license.24  It 
must be recognized, however, that “the best that any system of authentication can do is provide a 
20
 Clarke, supra note 16, at 19.  
21
 Clarke, supra note 16, at 17.  
22 Cite needed
23
 NRC, supra note 1, at 38-39:
Another possibility is a memory card (or storage card), which would hold more information and be more 
expensive than the magnetic-stripe cards of the previous example.  These cards contain memory as well as some 
security logic to prevent unauthorized reading or tampering with their data.  The information contained on them 
could be digitally signed (that is, a number would be associated with that information that is dependent on a secret 
known only to the signer as well as on the data itself) to prevent easy counterfeiting.  The correspondence between 
the user and the card (along with the information on the card and in the database) could be ascertained through 
biometric authentication, which would be undertaken using special equipment – such as a reader for fingerprints or 
iris scans – in addition to presentation of the card.  An additional possibility is to use smart card technology that 
permits computation (such as digital signatures and encryption) to take place on the card itself.
Though successful attacks have taken place, these cards are even harder to counterfeit than memory cards.  
They might have a name, photo, number, and biometric data, all of which could be cryptographically signed.  The 
data would be backed up in a database to enable checking when reissuing a card and checking for duplicates when 
the card is first issued.  A card of this sort could engage in a real-time, cryptographic exchange with an online 
system to verify a user’s identity – possibly without exposing details of that identity to the organization performing 
the data capture – for example, an airline or a retail establishment. 
24
 See, Sobel, supra note 10, at 336-37 (The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators called for 
linking driers’ license records with Social Security, immigration, and law enforcement databases.)  See also, Richard 
Edwardson, National Identification Systems and Privacy Right, UCLA J. OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 4 (2002).
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compelling connection with some previous verification of identity.”25  In other words, identity 
documents or other tokens are only as good as the “breeder” documents that produced them; 
“[t]he accuracy of each layer of identification depends on the accuracy of the preceding 
layers.”26  While this may mean that no identification system can ensure completely that a given 
individual is who she claims to be, this problem goes more to the efficacy of a national identity 
system than to any question of legality. 
This capsule summary of the functions and broad features of a national identity system 
may sound familiar to anyone living in early 21st century America because identification linked 
to information is already part of daily life.  Some would conclude that we already have a national 
identity system, based primarily on the social security number.27  Richard Sobel, for example, 
contends that even prior to September 11th a national identity system “was developing from the 
combination of government databanks and ID requirements,” due to several pieces of federal 
legislation that combine a demand for identification with computerized records.28   Other 
proposed legislation would move the U.S. in the direction of a national identity system, without 
25
 NRC, supra note 1, at.  
26
 Lynn M. Lopucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX.L.REV. 89, 98 (2001); 
U.S. General Accounting Office Testimony of Robert J. Cramer, Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud 
Raise Security Concerns (Sept. 9, 2003) (Senate Committee on Finance) ( government officials generally did not 
recognize counterfeit documents in General Accounting Office attempts to obtain genuine driver’s licenses).
27
 See e.g., Rick S. Lear & Jefferson D. Reynolds, Your Social Security Number or Your Life: Disclosure of 
Personal Identification Information by Military Personnel and the Compromise of Privacy and National Security, 21 
B. U. INTL. L. J 1, 13-14 (2003).
28
 Sobel, supra note 10, at 323-32 (The five basic parts of an incipient national identification system are the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) hereinafter IRCA; the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996 (“IIRIRA”); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724 (1996) hereinafter IIRIRA; the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“Welfare Reform Act”); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) hereinafter Welfare Reform Act; the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) hereinafter HIPPA; and the Federal Aviation Administration ID 
requirement and Computer Assisted Passenger Screening system (“CAPS”); Id at 323.  Sobel also mentions 
educational  databanks.  Id. at n. 13.  A social security number is used by the military, appears on military identity 
cards, and must be given to captors by service members.  Lear & Reynolds, supra note 27, at 4-8.
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formally establishing one.29  One object of a true national identity system would be to allow 
access to information contained in several unrelated databases through one centralized system.30
B. Demands for Identification
Any system that depends on linking an individual with a certain identity, and hence to a 
body of data, must require that the person identify herself at some point or points in time, 
whether that identification is made by way of codes, tokens, biometrics, or some other means.31
In theory, participation in an identification system can be voluntary or mandatory.  An example 
of a “voluntary” program is the proposal for a “trusted traveler” card, which would exempt 
airline passengers from certain pre-flight inspections.32   While possession and use of such a card 
would be voluntary,33 the need to present it to gain the benefits of the program would not.  
Virtually any true national identity system requires mandatory participation, both in the sense of 
having an identity within the system and in presenting identification when required.34   This is 
certainly true for a system whose object was discovery of undocumented migrants; some means 
of proof of lawful presence in the U.S. would seem to be a sine qua non of its operation.  
29
 Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 123 “National ID Card Proposals by 
Another Name”  (“No member of Congress has introduced legislation that would implement a national ID system or 
ID card.  Instead there are several proposals that would establish a national ID card or system through the 
‘backdoor’ of other proposed legislation.”)  See sources supra note 2.
30
 Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 120
31
 See TAN 16
32
 See e.g. David Jones, What’s Your “Risk Score”?, In These Times (June 23 2003), at 17 (A trusted traveler 
program “would allow travelers to speed through airport security if they voluntarily agree to undergo an extensive 
background check and carried a card with a digital fingerprint or other biometric identifier.” Alan M. Dershowitz, 
Why Fear National ID Cards?, NY TIMES OCT. 13, 2001, at A23 (optional identity card would be allowed to pass 
through security “more expeditiously”). See also, Sarah D. Scalet, Who Do You Trust?, CIO Magazine (referring to 
a trusted traveler program as the “post-9/11 version of first class”).
33
 Cf., NRC, supra note 1, at 28 (“[E]ven when a system is nominally voluntary, attention should be paid to whether 
the large inconveniences of nonparticipation make it effectively mandatory.”)
34
 NRC, supra note 1, at 28.
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Realistically, demands for presentation of identification are inherent in any national identity 
system that would be worth having. 35
Observers fear, however, that these “identification encounters” will have several 
inevitable effects.  First, people would be required to carry the identification card or other token, 
and present it at designated interactions.36  Second, at least some of these encounters would 
entail involuntary stops to present the identity token, and would thus interfere with free 
movement, as well as imposing dignitary harms. “Day-to-day individuals could be asked for ID 
when they are walking down the street, applying for a job or health insurance or entering a 
building.”37    There is also some fear that these identification checks would be 
disproportionately directed at members of minority groups.38
None of these apprehensions is without precedent.  Even today, Belgium has a 
comprehensive national identity system and police officers can ask to see the identity card of any 
person found in public.39  When the British used identity cards for commodity rationing during 
and after World War II, police demanded to see the cards at other times, leading to protests and 
ultimately the end of the program in 1952.40  Identity cards were essential to South Africa’s 
apartheid system.  They also proved very helpful to Nazi and Rwandan genocidal killers, who 
used them to identity and locate members of their target ethnic groups.41
35
 NRC, supra note 1, at 28  (“In general, any attempt to ascertain that an individual does not possess an unwanted 
attribute (for example, malicious intent) requires a complete knowledge of behaviors related to that attribute, and 
hence mandatory checks.”) 
36
 Sobel, supra note 10. at 338-39, 363.
37
 Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 113
38
 Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 114, 118
39 Testimony of Rudi Veestraeten, Identity Cards and National Register in 
Belgium, in  “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 129, 131 (“Although such request on behalf of a 
law enforcement agency does not need to be [so] motivated, it mostly occurs only when there is a particular reason 
for a police officer to so do (suspicious behavior, events, security reasons).”  Id. at 131.
40
 Sobel, supra note 10, at 347.  
41
 Sobel, supra note 10, at 343-49.
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In addition to the burdens of carrying identification and producing it on demand, required 
presentation of identity tokens might have other effects on individuals’ freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure.  One is the monitoring of individual movement and activity.  
Each identification encounter would be an occasion to add information to the central database, 
facilitating government surveillance of movement and activity.42  In any high-integrity identifier 
scheme, it is feared by some, “[a]ll human behaviour would become transparent to the state and 
the scope for non-conformism and dissent would be muted to the point envisaged by the anti-
Utopian novelists.”43
Conversely, each identification encounter would contain the potential for the resulting 
information, rightly or wrongly, to cause a further interference with personal mobility.  This 
effect depends, of course, on what the information is and how it is used.  Historically, some 
identity cards have served in effect as internal passports.   “Under the most repressive regimes, 
such as those in Communist Eastern Europe, inhabitant registration schemes were instrumental 
in the prevention of unauthorized movement both within the country and out of it.”44
The Transportation Security Administration (and its forerunner) has had a computer-
based airline passenger screening in place since the late 1990’s, and is currently testing an 
updated version called CAPPS II.45  The CAPPS II system collects passengers’ personal 
information such as name, address, birth date and credit card number. It then checks this 
information against databases, including criminal history records, to produce a passenger 
42
 Testimony of Katie Corrigan, “Does America Need a National Identifier?” at 113
43
 Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,” 
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 34 (1994).
44
    Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy 
Issues,” 7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 27 (1994).  This was also true in a more rudimentary form 
for slaves in the antebellum South.  Sobel, supra note 10, at 343.
45
 Joe Sharkey, A Safer Sky or Welcome to Flight 1984?, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2003, at C9.
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security code of green, yellow, or red.46   According to the Transportation Safety Administration, 
this will “allow dynamic targeting on a real-time basis.”47 Those passengers receiving a rating of 
red will be denied boarding, something that has happened under the existing CAPPS system.48
In sum, it is almost inevitable that any national identity system, whether total or partial, 
will require individuals to present identification at certain times and places because “[t]he 
absence of the power to demand evidence of identity weakens the integrity of a general-purpose 
identification scheme.”49  Just what occasions would require an identification check is an 
important issue in the system design. At present, individuals must provide specified forms of 
identification to prove employment authorization at the time of hire,50 to obtain a passport,51 or 
to board an airplane.52 The provision of a social security number (often without actual production 
of the card) attends other transactions.53  Increased demands for identification, probably through 
presentation of a token or some other identification mechanism, are almost inevitable if a 
46
 Joe Sharkey, A Safer Sky or Welcome to Flight 1984?, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2003, at C9.  See also, Matthew L. 
Wald, U.S. Agency Scales Back Data Required On Air Travel, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A16 (Transportation 
Safety Administration “will not use information of a passenger’s credit, like a returned check or an unpaid bill, nor 
any health records.”) Larry Abramson, Plans to step up security screening for airline passengers have been 
derailed, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, August 1, 2003 (Lexis).
47
 Wald, supra note 46 (“The risk assessment function . . .  will determine the likelihood that a passenger is a known 
terrorist , or has identifiable links to known terrorists.”)  There are also plans eventually to identify people for whom 
there are warrants for violent crimes.  Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Critics Wary of New Traveler Profile System, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES   (August 26, 2003).
48
 Jones, supra note 32
49
   Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy 
Issues,” 7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 27 (1994).
50
 See supra note 18.
51
 U.S. Dept. of State, How to Apply for in Person for a U.S. Passport, 
http://travel.state.gov/passport_obtain_text.html (visited September 29, 2003) (previous U.S. 
passport; naturalization certificate; certificate of citizenship; or current, valid driver's license or 
government or military identification; plus a social security number). 
52
 Sobel, supra note 10, at 325. (Since October 1995, the Federal aviation Administration (“FAA”) has required 
airlines to ask passengers to identify themselves with government-issued identification.”)
53
 Sobel, supra note 10, at 324-27.
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national identity system is established.  Moreover, once the system was in place the tendency 
would be to use it, and over time to expand its use.54
III. IDENTITY CARD REQUESTS AND DEMANDS
The Fourth Amendment bars “unreasonable seizures,” including seizures of the person.  
Evaluating the effect of the Fourth Amendment on demands for identification involves 
determining first whether the demand is a “seizure;” if not, the Fourth Amendment inquiry is at 
an end.  If the encounter does entail a “seizure” the second question is whether it is one that is 
“reasonable.”  All manner of state-citizen interactions are potentially implicated by identity card
checking, and the Fourth Amendment analysis will be similarly varied.  This Part proceeds by 
both applying existing Fourth Amendment principles to the kinds of situations in which a 
national identity card would likely be requested or demanded and evaluating what effects a 
widespread national identity system would have on the law itself.
A. Consensual Interactions
Not every demand for identification involves a “seizure.”  For reasons of her own, an 
individual may choose to interact with a state agent requesting her identification, and the 
additional action of producing identification will usually not convert the voluntary encounter to a 
seizure.  There are however, degrees of voluntariness.  Moreover, an intrusive national identity 
system would, itself, probably affect how people perceive identity checks, and how they react to 
them.
At present one occasion for mandatory identification occurs when individuals must give 
identification information over the phone, over the internet, or by mail.  This is usually some
54
 Roger Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems:  Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues,” 
7 Information Technology & People, (No. 4) 6, 27 (1994).  (“It is only to be expected that various pressure groups 
will seek to increase the impositions as time goes by, in response to such problems as illegal immigration, perceived 
worsening of law and order, epidemics, natural disasters, national security emergencies, etc.”).  In addition, there is 
the real possibility of abuse of whatever system results.  See TAN infra.
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combination of name, code (e.g., social security or credit card number), and knowledge-based 
identifier (e.g. PIN, mother’s maiden name).55  Nothing even remotely approaching a seizure is 
involved in this kind of exchange because there is no personal restraint.  
At the level of personal interaction, identification is currently required during what may 
be described as registration procedures.  These include registration for drivers’ licenses, medical 
services, schools, and flights, as well as employment eligibility verification.  Airport check-in is 
the paradigm, and now necessitates government-issued photo identification.56  All of these tasks 
may require the customer to “stop” to register, and while the display of identification tokens may 
slightly lengthen the process, it is unlikely that those additional moments would convert it to a 
state-mandated seizure.  
The Supreme Court has refused to find a seizure in governmental questioning and 
identification requests of people already in confining circumstances.  In INS v. Delgado, for 
example, immigration agents moved through a factory, questioning workers and then asking for 
immigration papers from those who appeared not to be citizens.57  These requests for 
identification were held not to be seizures, because, in the Court’s view, the workers had no 
reasonable fear that they could not continue working or moving about the factory.58  INS agents 
also took positions near the factory exits.  The Court rejected the claim that the entire workforce 
was therefore seized because “[o]rdinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about 
has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the 
workers’ voluntary obligations to their employers.”59  The Court has followed this approach in 
55
 See supra note 16.
56
 See supra note 52.
57
 466 U.S. 210, 212-13 (1984).
58
 Id. at 220-21.  
59
 Id. at 218.
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two cases upholding police requests for permission to search the luggage or persons of interstate 
bus travelers, finding that although the passengers’ freedom of movement had been limited the 
restriction flowed not from police conduct but from being passengers on a bus.60  This reasoning 
easily applies to identification requests that are ancillary to other required interactions, such as 
the registration procedures described above, and strongly suggests that a national identity system 
could mandate the display of identification at other registration points, such as hotel or car rental 
check-ins, without creating any “seizure” of the person, so long as the registration would, by 
itself, ordinarily restrict movement.
Moreover, similar reasoning allows law enforcement agents to approach people and ask 
for identification even when their freedom of movement is not already limited by their own 
actions or decisions; in other words, as they go about their business in public.  As long as a 
reasonable person would feel free to “terminate the encounter” in the circumstances, then the 
person has not been seized;61 instead, she is participating in what the Court has called a 
“consensual encounter.”62  A request for identification documents falls within the scope of  a 
consensual encounter.63  The Court has recently stated, “Even when law enforcement officers 
have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions [and] ask for 
60
 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); see also United States. v. Drayton, 536 U.S.194, 201-02 ((2002).
61 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-36.
62
 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 221 (1984).  The Court’s conclusion 
that a “reasonable person” would truly feel free to decline law enforcement requests for conversation, identification, 
travel documents, and permission to search has been criticized as an unrealistic characterization of how people 
actually react to these tactics.  See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 
2002 SUPREME COURT REV. 153, 164-206 (2002); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure 
and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 135-141 (2003); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between 
Freedom and Restraint: the Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter 
Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 521-35 (2001).
63
 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980).  If the individual declines to answer questions or requests 
for identification, “and the police take additional steps . . . to obtain an answer,” however, then a detention has 
occurred.  Delgado, 466 U.S. at 217. 
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identification . . . provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means,”64 a holding that 
reiterates statements in earlier cases. 65
This doctrine has important implications for any national identity system.  Law 
enforcement agents could approach individuals on the street and request to see a national identity 
card at any time, without any prior suspicion of criminality or other illegality.  In a sense, an 
American national identity system could resemble the present Belgian one66 as long as the 
interactions were requests and not commands.  Simple requests for identification would probably 
produce compliance in the large majority of cases.67  This raises, however, one of the dangers of 
law enforcement use of consensual encounters.  Because the Fourth Amendment does not govern 
them, they can be initiated for no reason or for any reason at all, including the “racial 
stereotyping that is, unfortunately prevalent in every area of unregulated police discretion.”68  As 
a means of identity checking, then, consensual encounters run the risk of being employed on the 
basis of apparent race, ethnicity, or national origin, or appearing to be.  In fact, since September 
11, the debate on profiling understandably has shifted to role of racial, ethnic, national, religious 
profiling in preventing terrorism. Given that this would presumably be the principal goal of any 
national identity system, the role of profiles could easily figure in its design and use.  Airline 
checking and immigration enforcement, to name two contexts, have already been criticized for 
64
 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002).
65
 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
66
 See supra note 39
67
 Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or Obedience to Authority:  An Inquiry Into the “Consensual” Police-
Citizen Encounter 199 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University (on file with author)) (89% of 
motorists acceded to police requests to search their vehicles).
68
 Steinbock, supra note, 62, at 509.  DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM   47- 52  (1999).  The Court has made clear on several occasions that an officer’s 
subjective motivation for an otherwise lawful practice, even one based on racial or ethnic factors, is irrelevant to its 
legality under the Fourth Amendment.  Bond v. United States, 529 U.S.334, 338 (2000); Whren v. United States, 
517 U.S. 808, 816 (1996).
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the use of ethnic and national criteria,69 but some have contended that this is a rational response 
to the current terrorism threat.70  Because the constitution puts so little restraint on racial, 
national, and ethnic profiling in areas such as consensual encounters, it is especially important 
that the issue be addressed in the drafting of any such system.
In a true consensual encounter, no person could be compelled to produce her identity 
card, however.  After all, the whole premise of a consensual encounter is voluntariness on the 
part of the citizen, so individuals have a perfect right to say no.71 While consensual encounters 
are not at all uncommon as an investigative technique, particularly for drug interdiction,72 they 
are not currently imposed on large segments of the U.S. population, as would be the case if they 
became an integral part of identity-checking.  If a true cross-section of the American population 
were routinely asked to show their identity cards by government agents, the incidence of 
compliance might decline drastically.73  A national identity system that depended on voluntary 
responses to requests for identification thus runs the risk of perfectly legal, and possible 
69
 See e.g., Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1576-86 (2002) (describing the 
profiling of those who appeared “Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim” after September 11);  David A. Harris, Racial 
Profiling Revisited: “Just Common Sense” in the Fight Against Terror?, 17 Criminal Justice 36, 40-41(2002) 
(describing immigration enforcement and questioning directed against persons from the Middle East).
70
 See e.g., Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling and Terrorism, 22 N.Y.L.S. L .REV. 675, 698 (2003) (“So long as 
our adversaries tend to be members of definable groups, in principle we should be able to find them if we take group 
membership into account, not as either a necessary or a sufficient factor, but as a relevant one.”); DERSHOWITZ, 
supra note 2, at 208 (“It is foolish  . . . to misallocate our resources in the fight against suicide bombers by devoting 
equal attention to searching an eighty-year-old Christian woman from Maine and a twenty-two-year-old Muslim 
man from Saudi Arabia>”). See also,  U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Racial Profiling, (June 17, 2003) at 5-
6, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf  (race and ethnicity may be used in 
terrorist identification to the extent permitted by the nation’s law and the constitution).
71
 Steinbock, supra note 62, at 540-42.
72
 Nadler, supra note  , at 159 (“[L]aw enforcement agencies capitalized on the Bostick decision by stepping up their 
efforts to root out drug trafficking on interstate buses.)
73 DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM   8 
(1999).(“[P]olice officers routinely used method of investigation and interrogation against members of racial 




organized, civil disobedience.74  It is unlikely, therefore, that a national identity system could 
rely solely, or mainly, on consensual compliance as a means of identity verification.
B. Investigative Stops
In contrast to a consensual encounter, the compelled detention of a person for 
investigation, including a demand for identification, constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Though the real life factual differences between them can be quite small, an 
investigative stop is thus conceptually quite different from a consensual encounter.  Under Terry 
v. Ohio75and its numerous Supreme Court progeny,76 such seizures can be conducted only on 
“specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”77  These facts and inferences can relate to an ongoing crime 
or a past felony.  The level of evidence need for a lawful stop is often called “reasonable” or 
“articulable” suspicion, and can be distinguished from “inarticulable hunches”78 or “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion,”79 which are not sufficient to compel a person to halt for 
investigation.
Therefore, persons could not involuntarily be seized on a random or individual basis for 
identity checks in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court so held in Brown v. 
Texas, in which an officer stopped Brown for the sole reason of discovering his identity.80
Because the officer lacked any basis for believing Brown to be involved in criminal activity, the 
74
 Cf., municipal resolutions of noncompliance with Patriot Act.
75
 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
76
 See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000); United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
77
 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
78
 Id. at 22.
79
 Id. at 27.
80
 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
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seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.81  The Supreme Court similarly has barred the 
suspicionless stopping of motor vehicles to check license and registration82 or for questioning 
about the travelers’ citizenship.83  These cases obviously constitute an obstacle to the 
effectiveness of any national identity system that depends on more than spot checking of the 
already suspicious, though, as we shall see below, not necessarily an insurmountable one.84
In those cases where reasonable suspicion to stop a person is present, mandatory 
possession of an identity card or other identity token would greatly enhance the utility of the 
investigative stop – as well as the possibility of abuse.  As things stand now, the officer may 
demand identification and may even in some cases search for it,85 but without a statute 
criminalizing noncompliance,86 the officer has no way of securing it.  Even then, addressing a 
statute requiring “’credible and reliable’” identification that carries a ‘reasonable assurance’ of 




 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
83
 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). This holding does not apply at the border or its functional 
equivalents.  Id. at 876.
84
 See TAN  infra.
85 Generally, the warrantless seizure and search of a defendant’s wallet during an investigatory stop or 
Terry stop for purposes of identification constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure.  Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 
834 (Alaska 1975); Baldwin v. State, 418 So.2d 1219 (Fla. Dist. App. 1982); State v. Newman, 637 P.2d 143 (Or. 
App. 1981); State v. Biege, 787 P.2d 577 (Wash. App. 1990); State v. Miller, 1994 WL 246072 (Minn. App. Jun. 7, 
1994); State v. Webber, 694 A.2d 970 (N.H. 1997); Commonwealth v. Briscoe, 2001 WL 1830019 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jun. 
13, 2001); State v. Beegle, 2003 WL 21652737 (Wash. App. Div. 3 Jul. 15, 2003).  However, a California Court of 
Appeals found that the seizure of a defendant’s wallet for the purpose of identifying the defendant was within the 
scope of an investigatory detention.  People v. Loudermilk, 195 Cal App.3d 996 (Cal. App. 1987).  Also, the United 
States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, held that the search of a defendant’s wallet during an investigatory stop was 
reasonable when border patrol agents had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was an illegal alien and the 
defendant refused to disclose his identity or citizenship status. United States v. Garcia, 942 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1991).  
86
 See e.g. Tex. Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, §38.02 (a) (“A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to 
report or gives a false report of his name and residence address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and 
requested the information.”) quoted in Brown, 443 U.S. 47, 49 n.1.
87
 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). (statute  requiring citizen “who loiters or wanders upon the streets . . . . 
without apparent reason or business” to provide a “credible and reliable identification” and to account for their 
presence.  Id. at 353 n. 1, 356.
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Court’s opinion, this standard gave excessive discretion to the police, opening the possibility of 
discriminatory enforcement.88
The vagueness problem in Kolender could presumably be remedied by a careful 
specification of just what kind of identity documentation the law requires.89 A standard and 
relatively secure identity token would seem to be an essential feature of any national identity 
system,90 and it would be surprising if such an identity card did not satisfy the vagueness 
objections voiced in Kolender.  In other words, the specification of a national identity card as
adequate (or necessary) proof of identity would remove uncertainty about what constitutes 
proper identification.
That would still leave two issues not decided by the Supreme Court in Kolender: whether 
either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments stand in the way of requiring that someone stopped on 
reasonable suspicion identify herself.91  The Fourth Amendment argument, as made by Justice 
Brennan in two nonmajority opinions, seems to be that because it is conducted on less than 
probable cause, a Terry stop assumes a relatively low level of intrusion on personal privacy and 
mobility.92  A demand for identification infringes on the right of a person stopped on reasonable 
suspicion to refuse to answer police questions,93 and, overall, imposes on the suspect more than 
the seizure alone, and, overall, more than reasonable suspicion can justify.  The Ninth Circuit has 
88
 Id. at 360-61.
89
 See e.g., employment authorization documents supra note18.
90
 See TAN supra.
91 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355; see also. Brown, 443 U.S. at 53 n. 3 (Court stated it “need not decide whether an 
individual may be punished for refusing to identify himself in the context of a lawful investigatory 
92 Kolender, 461 U.S. 362-69 (Brennan, J. concurring); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,41-46 (Brennan, J. 
dissenting).
93
 Id. at 366 (“[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, police officers with reasonable suspicion that an individual has 
committed or is about to commit a crime may detain that individual, using some force if necessary , for the purpose 
of asking investigative questions.  They may ask their questions in a way calculated to obtain an answer.  But they 
may not compel an answer, and they must allow the person to leave after a reasonably brief period of time unless the 
information they have acquired during the encounter has given them probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest.”) 
(emphasis in original)(citations omitted).
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accepted these arguments and found criminal punishment for refusal to give identification during 
a Terry stop to violate the Fourth Amendment, at least where identification is not needed as part 
of the investigation.94  Most other courts, on the other hand, have upheld arrest and conviction 
for obstructing police business or for violation of statutes specifically requiring a suspect to give 
identification on request.95
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the purpose of an investigative stop is to 
confirm or dispel the suspicion that caused it.96  The officers may use reasonable means to do so, 
including briefly detaining, demanding identification, and directing questions to the person. If 
everyone was compelled to carry an identity card pursuant to a previously enacted national 
identity system, would it be “reasonable” to demand to see that identification of those persons 
stopped on reasonable suspicion?  The answer probably depends on two issues:  1) whether 
official knowledge of the person’s identity (and associated data) would assist in the investigation, 
and 2) how long, or otherwise inconvenient, that process would be. 
 On the first issue, once the police have articulable suspicion that a person is committing 
or planning a crime, there is a reasonable likelihood that an identity check, especially one that 
tapped into criminal history and law enforcement databases, would produce useful information.  
For example, if the reasonable suspicion concerned drug sale or possession, access to a criminal 
history for that or related crimes would at least intensify the investigation.  Similarly, data might 
confirm a suspect’s story – that, for example, she works in an isolated area -- and thus dispel 
suspicion.  There are myriad ways in which access to the suspects’ identity would further the 
investigation.  Probably the most significant effect of database-linked identity checks would be 
94
 Id.;  Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F. 2d 1491 (9th Cir 1987); Lawson v. Kolender 658 F. 2d 1362 (9th Cir. 
1981).
95
 See e.g. Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 U.S.565 (6th Cir. 2002) (reviewing cases).
96
 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687 (1985);  Royer, 460 U.S., at 500.  
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the discovery of outstanding warrants, which themselves would provide a basis for the suspects’s 
arrest.97  In short, a national identity card would make investigative stops more efficient and 
effective.
  It is hard to see how these uses would materially increase the intrusiveness of the stop 
itself.  While there would also be some circumstances in which requiring the suspect’s identity 
card would not advance the investigation, merely asking for or reading it does not seem to add 
appreciably to the stop’s intrusiveness.  Moreover, it would be silly and unworkable to ask the 
officer on the street to distinguish between stops where identification would help and those 
where it would not.  Rather, this would seem an area where a “bright-line” rule would make 
good sense.98
On the other hand, if the suspect was detained for an appreciable period of additional 
time, moved, or placed in a more confined area in connection with the identity check, then the 
process might be more intrusive than a Terry stop allows.99  This could happen, for example, if 
the identity information had to be transmitted to a database and a reply took a long time to arrive.  
While in theory this could be accomplished in the time it takes to authorize a credit card 
transaction, a glitch in database access or communication is certainly possible. It is debatable 
97
 If a national visa database could also be accessed, it is likely that a fair number of allegedly undocumented aliens 
would be identified.
98
 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (stressing police officers’ need to make quick ad hoc 
judgments).  See also, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (“A single familiar standard is essential to 
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on an balance the social and individual 
interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”).
99
 A stop, the Court has said, may last as long as is reasonably necessary to conform or dispel the officer’s 
suspicions.  United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).  At some point a stop cannot be justified on the basis 
of reasonable suspicion but becomes tantamount to an arrest and thus requires probably cause.  Id. at 685.  In United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Court held that a ninety-minute detention alone rendered the search 
unreasonable.  Id. At 709-10.  Otherwise, the Court has assessed the issue as one of overall reasonableness.  
Important factors in this assessment include the duration of the stop, whether the police diligently pursue the 
investigation, Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, and whether the suspect is moved during the detention, Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 504-05 (1983).         
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whether a prolonged detention pending the outcome of a database search would be a 
“reasonable” incident of an investigative stop.100
The last objection to requiring an identification token on pain of criminal prosecution is 
that if the police may arrest a person for failing to identify herself during a Terry stop, then 
identification statutes “bootstrap the authority to arrest on less than probable cause.”101  There is 
very little to this argument.  If the state can legitimately require people to carry identity cards and 
they fail to produce them at statutorily specified moments, then there is now probable cause to 
arrest for that crime even if probable cause to arrest for the circumstances that produced the stop 
never developed.  Perhaps the fear is that the police would demand identification only, or mainly, 
from those whom they wanted to arrest for the underlying offense, but could not.  If a national 
identity system was in existence, this tactic might actually succeed in producing an arrest for 
failure or refusal less frequently, because more people would be able easily to supply 
identification.  In any event, it is hard to see how the possibility that an otherwise lawful stop 
might lead to an arrest for an unrelated crime somehow makes the stop itself, based upon 
independent grounds, questionable under the Fourth Amendment.102
Nor does the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause, by itself or in conjunction with 
the Fourth Amendment, bar officers from demanding identity cards from those stopped on 
reasonable suspicion.  Ordinary questioning of a suspect during an investigative stop has been 
held not to bear the kind of psychological “compulsion” to self-incriminate that would trigger 
100
 Traffic stops, a possible analogy, can generally last no longer than necessary to process the citation or warning.  
See e.g. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F 3d 874 (10th cir. 1994); People v. Cox, 782 N.E. 2d 275 (Ill. 2002).
101
 Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board , 279 F. 3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2002).
102 Terry stops can, for example, lead to assaults on the officers or obstruction of police business in ways unrelated 
to the reason for the stop, and the validity of these charges is beyond question.
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Miranda warnings.103  A demand for identification, however, does involve compulsion, because 
a refusal -- often now, and certainly under a national identity system -- would likely involve 
some criminal penalty.104   A suspect would thus face the choice between complying with a 
directive to produce her identity card or face arrest and prosecution.  Thus, though Miranda
warnings presumably do not have to be given, other core Fifth Amendment issues are potentially 
involved in demands for identification.
Assuming it is compelled, is a response to an identification demand also testimonial?  
The individual is saying “XY is my name,” or “ABC is my address.”  The suspect is being 
“asked for a response requiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or 
belief,” and the answer therefore contains a testimonial component.105  Because a false answer 
could also result in criminal penalty,106 and a truthful answer could sometimes serve to 
incriminate, the “cruel trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or punishment could potentially be 
present.107  Similarly, someone who hands over an identity card is implicitly stating, “The 
information on this card pertains to me.”  The communication implicit in that act of production 
makes testimonial a response to a command to supply identification.108
For Miranda purposes, at least, even where there is compelled testimony, questions 
“normally attendant to arrest and custody”109 are exempt from the usual interrogation rules.  
Eight Justices have concluded that responses to these “booking questions,” designed to obtain 
103
 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (Miranda warnings not required during traffic stop).
104
 See TAN   supra (criminal penalties under specific statutes requiring the production of identification during 
lawful stops or under obstruction of justice statutes).  In contrast to other documents whose production may later be 
required because they were voluntarily and independently created, e.g. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); 
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), a person presumably would have been compelled to participate in 
“creation” of the identity card.
105
 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 597 (1990)
106
 18 U.S.C. §1001; see e.g. the Texas statute in Brown, supra note  .
107
  Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55  (1964).
108
 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
109
 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
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biographical data for police administrative purposes, are an exception to the Miranda rules.110  It 
would not be surprising for the Court to extend this administrative question exception to “core” 
Fifth Amendment compulsion.  The Court might be encouraged to do so by the fact that 
ordinarily a response to an identification demand would not be incriminating.  Although under 
Fifth Amendment case law it does not take much for a person to establish the requisite possibility 
of incrimination,111 the usual identity check is not likely to provide “a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prosecute.” 112  If an identity check produces any useful information at all it 
is likely to be the name and other data about a hitherto unknown person against whom evidence 
of a crime already exists.  This is not the kind of testimonial incrimination against which the 
Fifth Amendment protects.113  It of course is possible that in some exceptional case presenting an 
identity card will constitute compelled self-incrimination.  It is even more possible that the 
police, having received compliance with their identification demands, will proceed to interrogate 
outside of the “booking questions” or the simple command to produce an identity card.  Neither 
of these possibilities, however, makes the ordinary identity check incriminating as a general 
matter. Importantly, because this is a case-specific question, no blanket injunction against a 
national identity system on Fifth Amendment grounds could succeed.   
Finally, even where an identification request nevertheless did appear to implicate the 
Fifth Amendment, the recent decision in Chavez v. Martinez calls into question whether a Fifth 
110 Muniz, 495 U.S. at  601.(questions regarding name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and age).  Id. 
at __.  Four Justices (Rehnquist, C. J., White, Blackmun, Stevens) consider the answers non-testimonial.  (Brennan, 
O’Conner, Scalia, Kennedy) found the answers to be testimonial but to constitute an exception to Miranda rules. 
111
 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001).
112
 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
113
 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“Disclosure of name and address is an essentially neutral act.”).  
See also, id. at 433 (“Although identity, when made know, may lead to inquiry that in turn leads to arrest and 
charge, those developments depend on different factors and independent evidence.”) (upholding California “hit and 




Amendment violation would occur if the suspect’s responses were never introduced at trial.114  If 
the required production of identification resulted in compelled testimonial incrimination, under 
Chavez, unless and until the statements or information (or evidence derived therefrom) were used 
at trial there would be no constitutional claim.  This would raise questions about what evidence 
was “the fruit of the poisonous” identification; that is, what causal connection need be shown 
between the compelled self-identification and the trial evidence, and to what degree doctrines 
like independent source and inevitable discovery would come into play.115  It is almost certain 
that identity could be independently proved at trial and that associated data could be shown 
likely to be inevitably discovered.116
In summary, identification checks would involve compelled testimonial communication.  
Courts would thus have to decide whether the disclosure of personal data would nevertheless fall 
outside the Fifth Amendment’s coverage under a doctrine like the “booking question” exception 
to Miranda.  Moreover, the ordinary identity check would rarely reveal incriminating 
information, and even more rarely directly lead to tainted, and thus suppressible, courtroom 
evidence.  As a general matter, the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause, therefore, 
appears to present no insuperable barrier to required identity checks.
C. Arrests and Citations
All the reasons permitting law enforcement personnel to demand identification from 
those stopped for investigation, and one more, apply to persons being arrested or given a traffic 
114
 123 S.Ct. 1994 (2003). (Four of the Justices (Thomas, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia) maintain that the Fifth  
Amendment cannot be violated unless the evidence is actually introduced against the defendant. Two others (Souter 
and Breyer) maintain that this is the general rule and is certainly true in this case.)
115
 Murray v. United States.; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply to information 
that ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means).
116
 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
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citation.  These people have already been seized on an allegation of probable cause,117 so a 
demand for identification imposes no additional restraint.  Identification is even more necessary 
for the processing of the arrest or traffic citation than for an investigative stop.118. An arrest will 
usually lead to an arraignment on a criminal charge, and courts will often refuse to arraign an 
individual whose identity is unknown.119  Before an arrestee is released on bail it is important to 
know whether or not she is wanted for other offenses.  A traffic citation also requires some 
assurance that the person cited will respond or face the consequences
The Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Whren that the officers’ motivation for a traffic stop is 
irrelevant to its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment; in other words, a driver cannot 
object to a stop on the ground that it was a “pretext” for the officers to perform one of the many 
investigation measures attendant on a traffic stop120 Because identification verification is always 
part of a traffic law enforcement,121 police officers could, consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, pull drivers over to check that identification so long as they had first observed a traffic 
violation.  They would simply have to follow the driver until she committed the moving violation 
that almost all drivers eventually do.122  None of the restraints on police discretion to target 
117United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (probable cause justifies arrest);  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
808, 810 (1996)(“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have 
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”)
118
 Illinois v. Lafayette, 402 U.S. 640, 640 (1983) (noting the importance of ascertaining or verifying arrestee’s 
identity);  Smith v. United States, 324 F. 2d 879, 882 (routine identification processes are part of custodial arrest).
119 cite needed
120
 Whren, supra note 117   ; Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (valid traffic stop not rendered unreasonable 
by officers’ subjective aim to search for evidence of crime.).  See also David A. Harris,  The Stories, the Statistics, 
and the Law:  Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 311-18 (1999).
121
 David A. Harris, Car Wars:  The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556, 568 
(1998)  (The traffic stop gives the officer the opportunity to walk to the driver's side window and . . . request license 
and registration . . . “).
122David A. Harris, Car Wars:  The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556, *559-
66 (1998) (“Vehicle codes, which exist in every state, contain an almost mind-numbing amount of detailed 
regulation.  There are, of course, the usual "moving violations," such as speeding, failing to obey stop signs, and 
changing lanes without signaling.  But these violations only begin the catalog of possible offenses.  There are traffic 
infractions for almost every conceivable aspect of vehicle operation, from the distance drivers must signal before 
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individuals on the basis of race or other appearance-based factors that the Supreme Court has 
imposed with checkpoints apply in this context.123  The history of traffic enforcement against 
minority motorists proves that law enforcement officers are perfectly willing to take advantage 
of this opportunity.124
Traffic stops therefore present a powerful and dangerous tool for any national identity 
system.  Powerful because with enough law enforcement desire and effort, virtually any driver 
could be made to stop and present an identity card; dangerous because of the unlimited official 
discretion this practice allows.  In the context of a national identity system, Whren opened more 
of a Pandora’s Box than the Court knew.  For this reason, statutory restraint on the use of traffic 
stops as a means of identity checking should be considered as part of any national identity 
scheme, though it must be acknowledged that such limitations would be difficult to define and 
enforce.125  There are, of course, legitimate reasons to stop people for traffic violations. How 
turning,  to the times of day and weather conditions that require drivers to turn on their lights.”)   are not even clearly 
defined, giving officers the discretion to stop drivers who are operating vehicles in ways and under conditions that 
are not "reasonable and prudent."   And if regulation of driving is pervasive, legal requirements concerning vehicle 
equipment may be even more so.  For example, state traffic codes mandate the kind of lights each vehicle must have 
and the distance from which these lights must be visible, the types of license plates and regulatory stickers vehicles 
must carry, how loud an exhaust system may be, and even how deep the tread on a car's tires must be. The upshot of 
all this regulation is that even the most cautious driver would find it virtually impossible to drive for even a short 
distance without violating some traffic law.  A police officer willing to follow any driver for a few blocks would 
therefore always have probable cause to make a stop under Whren.”).  See also, David A. Harris, “”Driving While 
Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. OF CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 544, 557-58 (1997).  
123
 See TAN  infra.  For this reason David Moran has contended that “Atwater and Sullivan effectively rendered 
irrelevant the Court's other major vehicle search case from the 2000-2001 Term, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, in 
which the Court held that the police could not set up roadblocks for the primary purpose of catching motorists 
transporting narcotics.  If an officer may stop any car she observes committing any traffic or equipment violation, 
arrest the motorist and search the car, there is no need to set up roadblocks.  Indeed, it would obviously be much 
more efficient and productive for the police to single out "suspicious" motorists, stop and arrest them for trivial 
violations . . . . .”) David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car at Any 
Time, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 815, 832 (2002).
124
 Harris, Stories, Statistics, etc.
125
 Cf., U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: Racial Profiling, supra note 70 (“[T]he officer may not use race or 
ethnicity as a factor in deciding which motorists to pull over.”); but see id. at 5-6. (race and ethnicity may be used in 
terrorist identification to the extent permitted by the nation’s law and the constitution).
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could police be dissuaded from doing so for the “wrong” reasons?  It would be possible, for 
example, to bar identity card demands during traffic stops for certain minor infractions.  This 
would result in some missed connections to valuable data, but it might be necessary in order to 
discourage stops made for the primary purpose of identity checks.  Official inducement to stop 
vehicles for minor offenses in order to demand national identity cards is one major disadvantage 
of an identity system.
D. Checkpoints
Checkpoints entail the stopping all persons or vehicles (or a pre-designated subset) 
passing a particular location.  They are a potentially important method of identity determination 
for any national identity system, both because they could reach large numbers of people and 
because they could be placed at or around sensitive locations.  From an efficiency standpoint 
they do not rest on the voluntary compliance of consensual encounters; nor do they depend upon 
the reasonable suspicion of illegal behavior required for investigative stops.  Checkpoints, in 
short, are both compulsory and total in their potential coverage.  Roadblock-type checkpoints 
have already been employed for immigration enforcement, sobriety checking, drug interdiction, 
and other national security and law enforcement objectives, and there is therefore a fairly 
substantial body of case law on their legality under the Fourth Amendment.  If a national identity 
system did employ checkpoints, they would likely be applied to pedestrians as well, a use not yet 




 Forcing people, in vehicles or on foot, to stop at checkpoints constitutes a seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment.126  The question then becomes under what circumstances such 
suspicionless seizures are reasonable.  In answering that question the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between checkpoints whose primary purpose is to “detect evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing” and those that serve some “special need” other than the general interest in 
crime control.127  The case creating this distinction, Edmond v. City of Indianapolis, held that a 
checkpoint whose primary purpose was to apprehend persons carrying illegal drugs fell in the 
former category.128  Any checkpoint whose primary purpose is to “advance the general interest in 
crime control” violates the Fourth Amendment’s ban on seizing people without some 
individualized indication of criminality and is per se unreasonable.129  On the other hand, 
checkpoints “aimed primarily at purposes beyond the general interest in crime control”130 can be 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment and are evaluated for reasonableness on the basis of a 
three-pronged test discussed below.131  Using this test, the Supreme Court has upheld 
immigration and sobriety checkpoints, and in dicta has indicated approval of roadblock-type 
stops for highway license and registration checks,132 at government buildings or airports,133 or to 
“thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way 
of a particular route.”134
126
 Martinez-Fuerte v. United States, 428 U.S.  543, 556 (1976); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 
444, 450 (1990); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
127
 Edmond, supra note 126, at 37-8, 41.  See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.67 (2001).
128 Edmond, supra note 126.
129
 Id. at 44, n. 1.
130




 Prouse, supra note 82 , at 663.
133
 Edmond supra note 126, at 48-49.
134
 Edmond supra note 126, at 49.  See also Lidster v. Illinois, -- U.S. – (May 5, 2003) (granting certiorari on a case 
involving an “informational” roadblock being used to distribute flyers and look for witnesses to a hit and run 
accident in that area exactly a week before).
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Whether national identity system checkpoints would have as their primary purpose the 
“detect[ion of]  evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” would depend, of course, on the 
origins and contours of the program, but it seems unlikely that general crime detection would be 
the primary purpose of such a system.  Given the deep-seated national reluctance to adopt a 
national identity card, it would probably not be put into use unless there was a substantial threat 
to national security, possibly in the form of more terrorist attacks.  If so, the purpose would be 
the prevention of further attacks.  While such attacks would obviously be serious crimes, the fact 
that the harm is also the subject of the criminal law would not necessarily keep these checkpoints 
from serving a predominantly “non-criminal” purpose. The immigration checkpoints in 
Martinez-Fuerte and the drunk driving roadblocks in Sitz sought to prevent harms (the presence 
of undocumented aliens and inebriated drivers) that are also the object of criminal penalties.135
On the other hand, it could be argued that “terrorism” encompasses a variety of crimes, 
and indeed is just crime with a particular motivation and/or target.136  Anti-terrorism checkpoints 
would stretch the rationale of “special needs”/“non-criminal purpose” searches to its limit, if not 
beyond.  It is likely, however, that courts would find anti-terrorism checkpoints to be 
distinguishable from general crime fighting, particularly in the face of the enormous public 
pressures that would probably lie behind their creation.137  Lower courts that have considered the 
permissibility of checkpoints on open military bases in the wake of Edmond have distinguished 
135
 Cite dissent in Edmond.  
136
 On the varying definitions of terrorism see e.g. James A.R. Nafziger, The Grave New World of Terrorism: A 
Lawyer’s View, 31 DENVER J. OF INT’L. L. AND POLICY 1, 8-10 (2003).
137 Indeed, if the Supreme Court found itself unable to classify prevention of terrorism as a “special need,” it would, 
I suspect, abandon Edmond (a 5-4 decision) before it would strike down suspicionless identity checks under a 
legislatively established national identity system.
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national security protection from society’s general interest in crime control, and have upheld the 
practice.138
Congress could virtually insulate identity checkpoints from an Edmond challenge by 
making immigration enforcement a major, if not primary, purpose.  Emphasizing the importance 
of border control, the prevalence of illegal alien presence in the U.S., and the difficulty of 
interdicting those from Mexico, the Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte upheld a challenge to 
vehicle roadblocks, each located approximately 65 miles from the Mexican border, in California 
and Texas.139  The Edmond Court was careful to distinguish and preserve Martinez-Fuerte, 
invoking again the special need to police the border.140  Checkpoints under a national identity 
system would likely be distributed around the country and not necessarily be located within a 
short drive of an international border as in Martinez-Fuerte.141  They would, in all likelihood, be 
designed to identify not only illegal border crossers from Mexico but any noncitizens unlawfully 
present in the U.S.142  A broader-gauged immigration focus would not, however, convert their 
purpose to one of general law enforcement.  In short, checkpoints whose principal purpose is the 
identification and apprehension of noncitizens illegally present in the U.S. would certainly fall 
outside of Edmond’s limited ban on suspicionless checkpoint seizures.  
2. Reasonableness Determination
138
 United States v. Green, 293 F. 3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hawkins, 249 F. 3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 
2001).
139 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 545-50.
140 Edmond, supra note 126, at 38-40, 47.
141 A national identity system that relied on identification checkpoints might also differ from the Martinez-Fuerte 
roadblocks by their use with pedestrian as well as vehicle traffic.  This difference would not seem to have any 
bearing on whether the checkpoint was for general criminal enforcement rather than for immigration control, 
however, though it might affect the balancing used to determine their legality.    See TAN    infra.
142




For checkpoints whose primary purpose is not general law enforcement, the Supreme 
Court determines reasonableness (and thus compliance with the Fourth Amendment) using a 
three-pronged balancing test.  The Court balances 1) the government’s interest in preventing the 
relevant harm, 2) the extent to which the checkpoint system can be said to advance that interest, 
and 3) the degree of intrusion on those persons who are stopped.143  The following subsections 
discuss how this balance might apply to checkpoints employed in a national identity system.
a. Interest in Prevention
In assessing the degree of the problem it addressed, much would turn on the 
circumstances behind national identity checkpoints and the aims they were designed to achieve.  
It is hard to imagine, for example, that prevention of identity theft or election fraud, or the need 
to assure that government benefits are delivered correctly, would count as substantial 
government interests for widespread identity checkpoints.  On the other hand, as indicated above, 
a national identity system directed at a real and present danger of terrorist attacks or the illegal 
presence of millions of noncitizens would almost certainly suffice.  In Sitz the Court measured 
the magnitude of the drunk driving problem by its annual death and personal injury toll and  
amount of property damage.144 In the period after September 11th there would have been no 
question about the scope and seriousness of the threat of domestic attack.  The absence of 
additional attacks thus far would probably not lower significantly the governmental interest, 
though, particularly in light of the subsequent apprehension and conviction of several people for 
143 Sitz, supra note 126, at 455.  See also, Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 555. Brown v. Texas?
144
 Sitz, supra note 126, at 451 (citing 25,000 deaths, one million personal injuries, and five billion dollars in 
property damage per year).
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supporting or planning terrorist activity, as well as the elevated threat levels during the past two 
years.145
 As for immigration enforcement, what the Court said in 1976 Martinez-Fuerte is still 
true:  despite (or perhaps because of) the national policy to limit immigration, “large numbers of 
aliens seek illegally to enter or to remain in the U.S.” 146  What is different now is that a much 
smaller percentage of undocumented migrants than Martinez-Fuerte’s estimate of 85% is from 
Mexico.147  Also, comparatively more undocumented migrants are now likely to be people who 
overstayed their visas than people who entered the country surreptitiously.148  These people can 
be anywhere in the country, pointing toward a greater necessity of enforcement activity in the 
nation’s interior.  
Unlawful alien presence is not an unmitigated harm, and the costs and benefits are 
subject to vigorous debate.149 The undocumented population was assumed to be a serious 
national problem in Martinez-Fuerte, however, and Congress would be entitled to find it to be so 
if it created an immigration-focused national identity system.150  Moreover, to the extent that a 
145 Need data on DHS threat levels since they began.  . Ellmann, supra note 70, at 683 (“[P]reventing terrorism 
presents an especially compelling interest. . .  . Terrorism is a danger to huge numbers of people, and perhaps to the 
nation itself, in a way that each individual crime of violence can hardly ever be.” (emphasis in original).
146 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 551.  The Court mentioned a possible 10-12 million aliens illegally in the 
country.  Id.
147
 See Eduardo Porter, Illegal Immigrants May Total 8.5 Million, Wall St. J. August 14, 2001 at A4 (estimating that 
4.5 million of 8.5 million undocumented migrants, or 53%, are from Mexico) cited in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1112 (3d ed. 2002). Over 80% of undocumented immigrants are 
from the Western Hemisphere, however.  T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 601 
(4TH ed. 1998).
148
 About 41 per cent of the total undocumented population in 1996 were “overstays” who entered legally on 
temporary visas but failed to leave.  Aleinikoff, supra note 148, at 601, and the percentage seems to be increasing.  
See James A.R. Nafziger, The Grave New World of Terrorism: A Lawyer’s View, 31 DENVER J. OF INT’L. L. AND 
POLICY 1, 6 (2002) (“For many foreign visitors, visa overstaying has become the immigration procedure of choice.”)
149
 For a discussion of the several ways of measuring the impact, and summaries of and some selection from the vast 
literature on the subject, see Aleinikoff et al., supra note 147, at 610-20; Legomsky, supra note 147, at 1111-13.  For 
a more anecdotal account, see ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE 
AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 75-108 (2003) (describing costs and benefits of undocumented agricultural labor).
150
 This is particularly so because of Congress’ traditional plenary power over immigration.  See e.g. Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).  To what extent this doctrine still exists, and its extent is the subject of 
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terrorism threat comes from persons who are not U.S. citizens, especially those here without 
permission, the governmental interests in preventing terrorist attack and illegal migration 
reinforce each other.151  All of this suggests that the nature of the immigration problem may have 
changed in the twenty-five years since Martinez-Fuerte, but its severity has not diminished and 
may actually have increased.
b. Effectiveness
The second factor in the balance, the extent to which checkpoints advance the identified 
interest, also depends on the problem or problems the checkpoints are designed to address. Let us 
assume that these are prevention of terrorist attack and mitigation of illegal alien presence, or 
some combination of the two.  Checkpoint effectiveness can be measured in several different 
ways: 1) the absolute number of suspects apprehended, 2) the rate of apprehensions (the number 
of suspects divided by the number of individuals stopped); or 3) relative effectiveness compared 
to other methods of prevention and enforcement.  The Supreme Court has considered all three 
outcomes in evaluating checkpoints, though not in any systematic way.  The following 
discussion applies these measures to hypothetical immigration and anti-terrorism identification 
checkpoints.
As noted above, the country and the Court already have substantial experience with 
immigration checkpoints in the form of roadblocks on major highways leading from the border.  
The San Clemente checkpoint, located 66 miles north of the Mexican border on Interstate 5, the 
long-standing debate.  See e.g. Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMM. L.J. 339 (2002); 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power:  The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMM. 
L.J. 362 (2002).  Whatever its contours, a deference to Congressional conclusion that unlawful immigration was a 
serious problem would seem to be an unexceptionably mild use of the doctrine.
151 On the pros and cons of using immigration enforcement as a weapon against terrorism, see e.g. Victor C. 
Romero, Decoupling “Terrorist” from “Immigrant”: An Enhanced Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. 
Gender Race & Just. 201,202-06 (2003).
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principal highway between San Diego and Los Angeles, resulted in the apprehension of 17, 000 
undocumented aliens in 1973.152  In fiscal year 2000, the San Clemente and Temecula 
checkpoints in California produced slightly less than 10,000 arrests.153 In absolute terms, then, 
highway checkpoints can be quite effective, at least when they straddle a well-traveled Interstate 
in the vicinity of the border.
 Of greater concern, however, is that the San Clemente checkpoint relied on referring 
some motorists for a “secondary inspection” of three to five minutes, at which they would be 
questioned about their citizenship or immigration status.  These referrals, the Court assumed, 
“are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry.”154  It is hard to see how secondary 
referrals would work outside of the factual context of the Mexican border.  Could other ethnic 
groups be pulled aside for secondary inspection on the basis of their “apparent [fill in] ancestry”?  
Putting aside the indignity of this of ethnic targeting,155 it is wildly inefficient.  Under a national 
identity system, however, presumably, every person would have to present a national identity 
card to verify lawful presence in the U.S.  Longer detention and more thorough questioning 
would be necessary only for those who lacked proof of citizenship or lawful presence. This form 
of “secondary” inspection eliminates the discretionary and profiling aspects of past 
checkpoints.156   It does, to some degree however, correspondingly increase the inconvenience 
152
 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 554.  The Court’s projection of the data for 1974, based on eight days of 
operation at issue in the case, was 33,000 arrests.  Id.
153
 United States Border Patrol San Diego Sector, Press Release (September 13, 2000) (on file with author).
154
 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 563.  The dissent in Martinez-Fuerte focused most of its ire on this aspect of 
the immigration roadblocks. (“Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully in this 
country must know after today’s decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being subjected 
not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation.”) (Brennan, J., dissenting) Id. at 572.
155
  Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78
WASHINGTON U. L. Q.  675, 726-28 (2000).
156
 Dershowitz, supra note 2, at 203 (national identity card eliminates justification for racial and ethnic profiling).  It 
would be analogous to the requirement that all prospective employees present proof of citizenship or other work 
authorization, regardless of their appearance, attire, or “native” English speech.  INA §274A(a)(1)(B).
7/13/2004
40
for everyone.157  Moreover, the discretionary aspects of checkpoint placement would, 
presumably, remain, raising the possibility of placement in ethnically selected target areas.158
  Measuring as it does rate of success, the ratio between the number of persons stopped 
and the number apprehended is certainly an important factor in the reasonableness balance.159
Existing checkpoints impact an enormous number of vehicles and the success rate is relatively 
low.  In Martinez-Fuerte the Court found that .12% (or 12 of every 10,000) vehicles contained 
deportable aliens. (In Sitz it approved a 1.6% success rate for sobriety checkpoints.160)  While the 
Court has upheld immigration enforcement roadblocks with a miniscule rate of success, more 
general use of checkpoints would probably test even those numerical limits.  On the other hand, 
the Court in Sitz explicitly cautioned the judiciary against “a searching examination” of 
checkpoint effectiveness.161
The success rate of a national identity system designed to discover undocumented 
migrants is integrally tied to the third method of assessing effectiveness: relative effectiveness 
compared to other methods of prevention and enforcement.   In other words, are checkpoints 
effective and necessary compared to available alternatives?  The Court accepted roadblocks on 
major highways leading from the border in Martinez-Fuerte partly because “the flow of illegal 
157
 See TAN  infra.
158
 While perhaps legal, this would be profoundly unwise, creating, as it would, apartheid-type enclaves subject to 
special “border” controls.
159
 Prouse, supra note 82, at 659-60 (striking down random motor vehicle license and registration checks as 
unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
160
 Sitz, supra note 126, at 455 (noting that nationally sobriety checkpoints result in drunk driving arrests of 1% of 
motorists stopped).  But see id. at 461 (0.3% success rate at 125 Maryland checkpoints).  The difference between the 
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz balancing test and the Edmond primary purpose test is illustrated by the fact that the 
Indianapolis drug enforcement roadblock’s 9% rate of producing arrests for some offense, drug related or not, was 
irrelevant under the latter approach. 
161 Sitz, supra note 126, at 454 (Effectiveness evaluation is “not meant to transfer from politically accountable 
officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be 
employed to deal with a serious public danger.”)  Id. at 453.
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aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border” itself.162    If roadblocks were more 
widespread they would probably catch additional undocumented aliens, particularly if they were 
set up at other restricted access transportation routes or nodes. It is likely, however, that their 
success rate would be even less than border region checkpoints because of the lower 
concentration of undocumented aliens away from border areas.  In addition, if checkpoints were 
used with pedestrian traffic, ways to circumvent them would probably be available.  The 
checkpoints could be avoided unless they were mobile enough that the undocumented migrants 
were taken by surprise or the checkpoints were situated so that there was no way around them.  If 
these speculations are correct, the more widespread checkpoints became, and the more they were 
used against pedestrians, the lower their success rate is likely to be, though the total numbers of 
apprehended aliens would go up. 
With relative effectiveness, too, the Court urges deference to governmental preferences.  
“[F]or purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among . . . reasonable alternatives 
remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a 
responsibility for, limited public resources . . . .”163  Moreover, parties objecting to checkpoints 
have the burden of proving that “the particular law enforcement needs served by checkpoints
could be met without reliance on routine checkpoint stops.”164
Despite the passage of numerous immigration law amendments designed to discourage 
illegal entry and presence since 1976, including employer sanctions, expedited removal, new 
162 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 556.  The dissent in Sitz saw this as an important distinction between 
immigration and sobriety checkpoints.
163
 Sitz, supra note 126, at 453-54.  
164
 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 557 n. 12.
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inadmissibility grounds, restrictions on public benefits, and enhanced border enforcement, 165 the 
continued presence of millions of undocumented migrants makes it hard to imagine that a court 
would find checkpoints relatively unnecessary.166  This is true even though checkpoints are no 
panacea for illegal immigration.  They are as likely to drive the undocumented further 
underground – off thoroughfares and locations where checkpoints may be placed -- as to greatly 
increase apprehensions.  On the other hand, they may have some deterrent effect, by adding one 
more burden to illegal presence in the U.S.167 In sum, an expanded use of checkpoints in 
conjunction with a national identity card to enforce the immigration laws would seem to pass the 
“effectiveness” threshold of the current Fourth Amendment balancing test.  
To the extent that checkpoints would be employed to identify potential “terrorists” other 
than undocumented aliens, the various measures of efficacy come out differently.  Presumably, 
checkpoints would be used either to catch individuals already identified as terrorism suspects or 
to single out previously unknown persons who met some kind of “terrorist” profile.168  The 
closest current analogy to the latter method is the CAPPS system used to screen airline 
165
 See generally, Legomsky supra note 147 at 1109-1117; U.S. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY 9-179 (1994)
166
 In Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126 at 556-57 the Court held “maintenance of a traffic-checking program in the 
interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border.”  Indeed, 
dissenting in Sitz, supra 126 at 475 , Justice Stevens differentiated immigration from sobriety roadblocks on the 
ground that the former produce “thousands of otherwise impossible arrests.”
167
 Surprisingly, in upholding checkpoints, Supreme Court majorities have not chosen to rely on their deterrent 
effect, which, while not measurable statistically, should exist to some degree.  The dissent in Sitz, supra note 126, at 
470-71  does speak approvingly of the possibility that sobriety checkpoints might deter drunk driving, while noting 
the absence of data on the issue.  (“There is, obviously, nothing wrong with a law enforcement technique that 
reduces crime by pure deterrence without punishing anybody; on the contrary, such an approach is highly 
commendable.”)  For an example of an immigration enforcement effort that caused some undocumented immigrants 
to depart the U.S. on their own, see e.g., Susan Sachs, U.S. Crackdown Sets Off an Unusual Rush to Canada, N.Y. 
TIMES Feb. 25, 2003, at A1 (Pakistanis unlawfully in U.S. flee to Canada rather than undergo special registration).
168
 The latter effort is designed to address the problem that potential terrorists “have no visible markers.” David Cole 
Enemy Aliens, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 953, 985 (2002) 
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passengers.169  What effects would flow if checkpoints similar to those used at airports were 
installed in other public spaces?  
Preventing terrorism is certainly a powerful national goal,170 but it seems likely that the 
absolute number of suspects apprehended through extensive identification checkpoints would be 
very small and the success rate would be miniscule.171  To begin with, the number of terrorism 
suspects seems to be tiny, and the group of those who are not also in the U.S. illegally is even 
smaller.  Moreover, given what a crude instrument terrorist “profiling” is, the likelihood of 
mistaken “hits” is substantial.  Indeed, though statistics are not available, anecdotal reports 
suggest that false positives – the singling out of innocent travelers -- occur fairly regularly under 
the present version of CAPPS172 and are a concern in the design of CAPPS II.173  In short, the 
rate of success would be relatively low and the rate of error relatively high.  
In theory at least, the more information available to terrorist profiling software like 
CAPPS, the greater the chances for accurate prediction.  This produces the paradox that the more 
intrusive the data collection and search, the greater its effectiveness is likely to be.174  Thus, from 
the point of view of efficacy, tying a national identity card to as many databases as possible is a 
good thing.  Obviously, however, this encourages the collection and storage of more and more 
169
 See TAN  infra.
170
 See TAN supra.
171
 See Ellmann, supra note 70, at 699-700, n. 65-70 for an attempt to estimate the number of Al Qaeda terrorist 
within the United States and the relative hit rate of a program that tried to profile them.  Recognizing that we 
“simply do not know what the true number [of such terrorists] is” and that no profile is completely accurate, he 
assumes that a hit rate of even 1 in 10,000 would be a “plausible basis for action.” Id. at n. 65-66.  He also notes that 
a profiling program’s effect in deterring attacks adds to the measure of its usefulness.  Id. at n. 63.  On profiling’s 
effectiveness in general, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 
(2002).
172
 See TAN  infra.
173
 See Wald, supra note 46 (“The goal of CAPPS II, the department says, is to ‘significantly reduce the number of 
passengers who are misidentified as potential threats to passenger of airline security . . . .’”).
174
 Hence the controversy over the number and kinds of data sources that CAPPS II will tap into and the use that will 
be made of them.  See Wald, supra note 46 (reporting a reduction in both the scope of information collected on air 
travelers and on the use of credit and medical records).
7/13/2004
44
personal data and the linking of identity cards to greater numbers of databases, leading to a 
greater potential impact on privacy.  
With respect to the usefulness of other alternatives, much depends on the circumstances 
that would prompt widespread use of identification checkpoints.  Since September 11th the 
federal government has enacted and assumed a wide range of powers to protect domestic 
security. The best known is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,175 but there are a host of others, 
including the creation of special military tribunals and the indefinite detention of “unlawful 
combatants.”176 It is hard to know just how effective they have been, both because the 
government releases scant information about its anti-terrorism activities,177 and because no one 
really knows the extent of the threat.  In light of the deference given by the Court to the political 
choice of crime prevention methods, and the additional deference accorded the government in 
protecting national security in and preventing terrorism,178  if checkpoints were deployed in the 
wake of another domestic attack it seems highly unlikely the judiciary would find other 
alternatives to be so effective as to render checkpoints constitutionally unnecessary.
175
 United and Strengthening American By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
176
 See e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN (2002) (passim) (summarizing steps taken to identify and 
apprehend terrorists within the U.S.); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, 96 
A.J. INT’L L 237, 238-43 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, Terrorism and the Citizenry’s Safety, 17 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4, 
4-5 (2002); Padilla
177
 Amy Goldstein, Fierce Fight Over Secrecy, Scope of Law, WASH. POST at A1 (September 8, 2003) (Patriot Act 
bans disclosures about its use, and there is little information publicly available about its effectiveness.)
178
 See e.g.,Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001)(referring to the “heightened deference to the judgments of 
the political branches with respect to matters of national security.”); Center for National Security Studies, v. U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, 331 F. 3d 918, *27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding Dept. of Justice refusal to release the names of 
persons detained in the wake of September 11 attacks and granting deference to governmental assessment of impact 
on national security) (“American faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond 
the capacity of the judiciary to explore.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, [publication] [page] (“Times of 
heightened risk to the physical safety of their citizens inevitably cause democracies to recalibrate their institutions 
and processes, and to re-interpret existing legal norms, with greater emphasis on security, and less on individual 
liberty, than in “normal” times.) [page 1] (noting that  “[i]n terms of actually defining first-order claims of rights, 
American courts show great reticence to engage the permissible scope of liberties in direct, first-order terms” but 
rarely endorse the position that the executive can make these deviations unilaterally.). [pages  7,5]
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c. Degree of Intrusion
The third factor in the Supreme Court’s assessment of roadblocks has been the degree of 
intrusion experienced by stopped motorists.  The Court speaks in terms of “objective“ and 
“subjective” intrusions, with “objective” referring to physical interference with movement and 
“subjective” referring to concern or fright caused to those stopped by the roadblock.179  In the 
cases involving immigration and sobriety checkpoints, the Court found neither form of intrusion 
particularly weighty.
 The “objective” intrusion obviously depends on how a checkpoint is operated.  
Hypothetical checkpoints under a national identity system would most likely involve stopping 
each motorist or pedestrian, a demand for presentation of her identity card, and a “swipe” of the 
card through a reader linked with computerized records.180  The individual effectively would be 
detained both while this occurred as well as pending the electronic reply from the database.  If 
this sequence of events took no longer than an ordinary credit card authorization, it is doubtful 
the Court would find the objective intrusion to differ significantly from that of immigration or 
sobriety checkpoints, which the Court has characterized as “quite limited”181 and  “slight.”182  A 
“positive” response to the identity check, in the form of an outstanding warrant, an indication of 
unlawful presence in the U.S., or some other adequate ground, can justify further detention, but 
179
 Sitz, supra note 126, at 451-53; Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 558-59.
180
 See TAN  infra.
181
 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 557-58 (“The stop does intrude to a limited extent on motorists’ right to ‘free 
passage without interruption, and arguably on their right to personal security.  But it involves only a brief detention 
of travelers during which all that is required of the vehicle’s occupants is a response to a brief question or two and 
possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the U.S.”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted)
182
 Sitz, supra note 126, at 451).
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that additional seizure must have its own independent basis.183  In fact, the use of terrorist 
profiling raises separate Fourth Amendment issues of how much indication of “terrorist” 
potential, as revealed at the identification checkpoint, would be necessary to justify taking 
measures against a person, be it delayed or denied air travel, additional questioning or search, or 
even arrest. 184
Even for stops that do not result in a “hit”, circumstances could easily cause people to be 
detained or delayed to an extent that would weigh heavily against the practice.  The average 
delay occasioned by the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz was approximately 25 seconds,185 but 
checkpoints requiring an individual to remove an identity card from her pocket or purse, to have 
it read, and then to await clearance would probably take considerably longer.  This would be 
particularly true if the database scan took some length of time.  Moreover, anyone who has 
passed through airport security since September 11 knows that checkpoints can produce long 
waiting lines, interfering significantly with free passage.  Any of these entirely likely 
possibilities would significantly increase the objective intrusion and distinguish identity 
checkpoints from those upheld by the Supreme Court so far.
The “subjective” intrusion, however, can be seen as greater than that of current 
immigration and sobriety checkpoints.  In one way an identification checkpoint would be less 
intimidating, because the checking would be limited to asking for a clearly designated piece of 
identification.  This is much less open-ended than looking for signs of intoxication, for example, 
183
 See TAN  supra  (secondary inspections); Whren v. U.S.  .  ; Cf. Bob Herbert, Jailing Immigrants,, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 4, 2003, at A17 (describing the lawful, if unnecessary, detention of an alien after a computer check 
following a traffic stop revealed his undocumented status).
184
 Unless the law of search and arrest is going to be drastically revamped for terrorism suspects, the answers would 
seem to be the usual measures of reasonable suspicion for investigative stops and probable cause for extended 
detention, Dunaway, Sokolow search.  Treating persons identified by a terrorism profile as unlawful combatants 
would obviously negate some of these rules.  Padilla
185
 Id. at 448.
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at sobriety checkpoints.  Fear of facing unknown questions on unknown topics would thereby be 
reduced (assuming the officers stationed at the checkpoints restricted themselves to inspecting 
identification).  Although the Court has yet to consider pedestrian checkpoints, it seems unlikely 
that it would find them more invasive than vehicle checkpoints as a general matter.186  In fact, 
being forced to stop while on foot is in some ways less startling, and certainly less dangerous, 
than approaching a roadblock by car.187
Being checked against a database is probably much more frightening, though, than the 
checkpoint screening in Martinez-Fuerte or Sitz – even for an innocent person.188  The individual 
has no way of knowing the contents of the database against which her identification is being run, 
whether they are accurate or not, or what further impositions might be triggered by the 
information.  This uncertainty will turn every identification demand into cause for apprehension.
The purpose of the checkpoint matters less perhaps, in terms of “fear and surprise” than 
whether the checkpoint is anticipated or not.  Clearly there will more fright for even an innocent 
traveler189 on encountering an unexpected demand to show identification than from a permanent 
checkpoint akin to an airport security gate.190  The Court upheld, however, even temporary 
checkpoints in Sitz.  Nevertheless, this distinction is not meaningless, and checkpoints at 
permanent, known locations do carry less of a subjective impact.
186
 At one point in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court adverted to the general principle of lesser expectation of privacy in 
automobiles, ___ U.S. at _)__, but in context of the entire case the holding does not seem to turn on this factor.
187
 On the other hand, the individual lacks the “protective shell” of her automobile.
188
 Normally the Supreme Court only accounts for the reaction of a reasonable innocent person when determining 
Fourth Amendment issues.  See e.g. Florida v. Bosticle, 501 US at 438.  Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment 
as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH, L. REV. 1229 (1983).
189
 “Fear and surprise” relate to the “innocent” traveler, and not the trepidation produced in a person who fears 
legitimate apprehension at the checkpoint.  Sitz, supra note 126, at 451-52.
190
 Sitz, supra note 126, at 463 (“A driver who discovers an unexpected checkpoint on a familiar local road will be 
startled and distressed.”) (dissent of Stevens, J).
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Identification checkpoints, it may be argued, have an additional subjective effect, on a 
grand scale:  the psychic harm to a free people of having to “show your papers,” even if only at 
certain designated locations.191  Not only would people forced to go through identity checkpoints 
experience some degree of fear and surprise, but, knowing that this has become a permanent part 
of the social fabric, their sense of liberty would be diminished.192  This feeling is not mitigated –
indeed, it may be enhanced – by the knowledge that other people are also being stopped and 
asked for identification.193  Supreme Court majorities have not yet taken this subjective effect 
into account, and may never, but it is certainly real even if it cannot be measured quantitatively.  
Finally, the degree of intrusion must be considered in light of its frequency.  In its 
evaluation of the burden imposed by highway roadblocks, the Court has tended to describe and 
consider the interference with one individual’s freedom.   The more relevant fact in passing on 
the reasonableness of a methodology that depends on stopping everyone, however, is the 
collective burden.194  This imposition is a function of the intrusiveness of each individual stop 
multiplied by the number of stops the system will entail.  Looked at this way – admittedly, an 
approach the majority of the Court has avoided – national identity card checkpoints carry a very 
high cost.  If a national identity system were to involve checkpoints at all, it is likely to require 
191
 See e.g., Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F. 3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1999) (referring to checkpoints as “methods of 
policing associated with totalitarian nations”) (Posner, J.).
192
 Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human 
Emotions, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 125, 131 (Spring 2002) (arguing for an “affective” definition of privacy that 
takes into account peoples’ emotional reactions to surveillance).
193
 Compare United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (“At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other 
vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers’ authority, and he is much less likely to be 
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.”), cited in Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 558.
194
 The dissents in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz did pay some attention to the collective effects of highway roadblocks.  
See Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 571 (“[C]heckpoints . . .  detain thousands of motorists, a dragnet-like 
procedure offensive to the sensibilities of free citizens.) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sitz, supra note 126, at 472 
(describing sobriety checkpoints as “a program that produces only a handful of arrests which would be more easily 
obtained without resort to suspicionless seizures of hundreds of innocent citizens.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Cf. 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1974) (contrasting the 
“atomistic” view of the Fourth Amendment as a protection for isolated individuals with a conception of the Fourth 
Amendment as a regulator of governmental conduct as a whole).
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lots of them.  Otherwise, there is little point in having them; the few that did exist could be easily 
circumvented.  Thousands upon thousands of people would experience recurring delays and 
some degree of distress in connection with the number of checkpoints likely in any national 
identity system that used them.
d. Striking the Balance
Ubiquitous or even common demands for identity cards at stationary checkpoints would 
change the nature of American life, and judicial determination of their constitutionality would be 
a momentous event.  All aspects of the three-part equation for assessment of their reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment depend in great part on the checkpoints’ purpose, how they are 
structured, and the conditions that produced them.  For that reason, it is impossible to given any 
definitive answer in the abstract to the question of identity checkpoints’ constitutionality.  The 
fact-laden nature of the constitutional analysis, however, may run up against judicial reluctance 
to second-guess political choice in times of national danger.  This seems particularly true for 
measures receiving both executive and legislative endorsement, 195 as would almost certainly be 
the case for any comprehensive national identity system. 
That said, some tentative conclusions about national identity system checkpoints are 
possible.  First, those aimed mainly at undocumented aliens would seem to have a good chance 
of being upheld, principally because of the seriousness of the problem and the nation’s inability 
to solve it despite decades of legislative and enforcement efforts. To the extent that potential 
terrorists lurk among the undocumented, there is an additional justification.  It seems likely, too, 
that such identity checkpoints would have a reasonable rate of success, at least initially, as 
measured by the Court’s undemanding standard.  Unlike “terrorism” checkpoints, those that 
195
 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 191.
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focused on immigration offenders would be less likely to have “false positive” results 
(identifying U.S. citizens or lawful aliens as unlawful aliens), and would thereby keep unfounded 
seizures resulting from identity checks to a minimum.196
This assumes that immigration checkpoints would require identity cards of all persons 
passing through, not just those who “look” or “sound” foreign.197  The absence of police 
discretion in who is exposed to an initial stop, particularly in contrast to roving patrols, 198 was an 
important reason the Court upheld the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte.199  In that case, though, 
the Court did approve two other forms of official discretion: the choice of checkpoint locations200
and the referral for secondary inspection of persons of “apparent Mexican ancestry.”201  As noted 
above, the use of a national identity card at immigration-focused checkpoints eliminates the 
second type of discretion.  Freedom to choose checkpoint location would remain, however, and 
make possible troubling ethnic selection.  In theory checkpoints designed to catch illegal 
immigrants from Mexico, for example, could then be put in and around Mexican neighborhoods, 
or those aimed at "terrorists" from the Middle East placed near Arab population centers.
Establishing, as they would, ethnic enclaves subject to border control, such decisions would be 
profoundly unwise, even if legal.
196
 At first glance this, might seem like another example of what David Cole has described as a “sacrifice of the 
liberties of noncitizens in furtherance of the citizenry’s purported security.” David Cole Enemy Aliens, supra note 
168, at 957 (2002).  Even if imposed principally to apprehend undocumented aliens, though, checkpoints would 
impact all people equally.  In that sense they do not involve profiling or targeting of noncitizens.  Immigration 
focused checkpoints would be a law enforcement technique aimed at enforcing a body of law that affects only those 
who could not prove lawful presence.
197
 The absurdity of the latter category is illustrated by the fact that it would include two 2003 candidates for 
California’s governorship.
198
 Compare Prouse, supra note 82   and Brignoni, supra note  .
199
 Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 126, at 558-59 (insert quote)
200
 Id. at 559.
201
 See note  supra.
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Apart from immigration enforcement, checkpoints directed at catching potential terrorists 
would, and should, mainly fail to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment.  Huge numbers of 
people would need to be stopped in the hopes of locating a very small collection of previously 
identified individuals.  The profiling of potential terrorists is at a very rudimentary stage, and its 
coupling with identification checkpoints would in all likelihood yield a low rate of success and a 
large number of wrongful investigative detentions.  Despite the obvious importance of 
preventing further domestic attacks, these likely results should stand in the way of finding such 
general anti-terrorism identity card checkpoints to be reasonable seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The outcome would probably be different, however, at especially sensitive 
locations like airports, monuments, public buildings, or so-called national special security 
events.202
E. Summary:
Existing Fourth Amendment law, then, would allow a fair amount of identity checking, 
but forbid certain important techniques.  Nothing in the Fourth Amendment bars official requests 
for identification from any person at any time, as long as the person is not “seized” in the 
process.  This means that people could be required to present identification whenever they are 
already stopped, as for example at registration procedures, and could be asked, but not 
compelled, to present identification at other times under the so-called “consensual encounter” 
doctrine.  These two kinds of interactions alone would encompass a fairly large amount of 
identity checking.  In addition, when grounds to stop an individual already existed, as for 
202
 When an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service becomes the lead agency for 
the design and implementation of the operational security plan. http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml.  In 2002 
these included the Winter Olympics, Super Bowl, World Economic Forum, and State of the Union Address. 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=30&content=55.  See also, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, (2000) 
(Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy diminished in certain places, including airports).  check Lafave on the 
law in this area.
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example, in the relatively unusual instances when there was probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion of criminality, under Court precedent there is no Fourth Amendment objection to 
official demands for the person’s identity card.  In fact, the requirement that people carry an 
identity card would be useful in the investigation of those stopped on suspicion and in the 
processing of arrestees.  There is a real danger, however, that the desire to run an identity check 
would add one more temptation for police to perform traffic stops for ulterior purposes.
On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment does not allow random, suspicionless identity 
checks. To that extent the specter of law enforcement officers asking for “your papers, please” 
on an individual discretionary basis is barred by the constitution.  Moreover, identity checkpoints 
could not be established willy-nilly. They would, though, probably be constitutionally reasonable 
for certain purposes in certain circumstances.  If the Supreme Court follows its own roadblock 
precedents in an intellectually honest way, the outcome will very much depend on the scope of 
the problem checkpoints are designed to address, their effectiveness in doing so, and the degree 
of interference with free movement they entail.  On these factors, general checkpoints (outside of 
sensitive locations) designed to “profile terrorists” should probably be found to be unreasonable.
IV. DATA GENERATION, COLECTION, AND RETENTI ON
At the same time the checking of identity cards taps into existing databases, it can also 
generate new data by inputting the location and activity of the person whose identification token 
is being read.  For example, everyone is now required to present an identity card or other token 
while checking in for a flight.  In addition to indicating whether that person was a flight risk (or 
perhaps an undocumented alien or wanted criminal), the same readable token could easily create 
new data, such as the location, time and date the token was read, and even the flight and 
itinerary.  The database would now contain information about the person’s location and activities 
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it did not previously have.  This information could be used not only in subsequent identity 
checks but also potentially for more general law enforcement or other purposes.203
Clearly, the compelled collection of this data would impact personal privacy and what 
might be called the right of anonymity.204  People would know that the government has 
information about their movements and activities, some of a private or even intimate nature. 
They might change their behavior, not for fear of being caught doing something illegal, but 
because they were reluctant to contribute to a permanent, government-held record of their 
actions.205  The issue here, though, is not simply whether identity checks would compromise 
individual privacy but whether they would do so in a way as to constitute a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.206  This Part will evaluate the potential information generation, collection, 
and storage aspects of a national identity system under current Fourth Amendment law, and 
indicate how such a system might cause the law to change.  As with seizures, the answers to 
these questions depend on the circumstances, as well as the nature of the information itself. 
A. Registration Procedures
203
 See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance (3d ed. 1999), Section B: Technologically-
Assisted Physical Surveillance, Commentary to Standard 2-9.1(d) (vii) (p. 43) (“[T]he results of tracking operations 
. . . can be preserved well after the surveillance ends, in theory indeterminately.  This capability raises the specter of 
extensive libraries that retain information on vast numbers of individuals in perpetuity.”)
204 The United States Supreme Court obliquely recognized this threat in Whalen v. Roe, 429, U.S. 589, 605 
(1977) as it was upholding a statute requiring the reporting to a state agency, with patients’ names, of controlled 
substances prescriptions. (“We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts 
of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files.”); See also, Christopher 
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L. J. 213, 
237-52 (2002) (advocating recognition of a right to anonymity).
205
 Id. at 251 (“People who know they are under government surveillance will act less spontaneously, more 
deliberately, less individualistically, and more conventionally; conduct on the streets that is outside the mainstream, 
susceptible to suspicious interpretation, or merely conspicuous – even if perfectly harmless – will diminish and 
perhaps even be officially squelched.”).
206
 There are arguments that data collection through identity checks would also compromise First Amendment 
freedoms of speech and association and freedom of movement, but this Article will not address them.  See ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Electronic Surveillance (3d ed. 1999), Section B: Technologically-Assisted Physical 
Surveillance, Standard 2.9-1 (“Law enforcement use of technologically-assisted physical surveillance can  . . . 
diminish . . .freedom of speech, association, and travel . .  . .”).  Cf., Slobogin, supra note 204, at 252-63.  
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As mentioned above, in registration procedures an individual provides personal 
information to a public or private entity, often, but not always, in person.207  There are a 
surprising number of registration occasions in modern American life.  If a national identity 
number was used in these procedures, the data could end up in a database linked to that number 
and be accessible for government use.  This, in fact, is true already of a great deal of personal 
information through its association with social security numbers.208  A centralized national 
database would only fill in more of the picture of a person’s life.209
Deciding whether official access to such information is a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, therefore requiring a warrant, probable cause, or some other evidentiary basis, 
would put to the test a series of cases in which the Court has applied a concept of assumption of 
the risk of surveillance.  The Fourth Amendment aspects of government mandated data 
generation were first raised in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, a case challenging various 
aspects of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.210   The Act authorized the Secretary to require banks 
to retain, with identifying information, their customers’ financial records, including copies of 
checks over $100.  These “record keeping” requirements, plaintiffs contended, constituted an 
illegal search and seizure.  The Court curtly dismissed this claim on the ground that neither the 
Act nor the implementing regulations “require that any information contained in the records be 
207
 See TAN    infra (giving as examples registration for drivers’ licenses, medical services, schools, and flights, or 
employment eligibility verification).
208
 See TAN  infra.
209 ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 192 (Nicholas Bethell & David Burg trans., Modern University 
Library 1995 (1968) cited in United States v. Kincade, - F 3d -, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 20133 n. 35 (October 2, 
2003).
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record….  A man’s answer to one 
question on one form becomes a little thread….  There are hundreds of little threads radiating from every 
man, millions of threads in all.  If these threads were suddenly to become visible, the whole day would 
look for a spider’s web.
210
 416 U.S .21 (1974).
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disclosed to the Government; both the legislative history and the regulations make specific 
reference to the fact that access to the records is to be controlled by existing legal process.”211
However, when in United States v. Miller a depositor complained that the prosecution 
obtained his bank records by defective process, the Supreme Court held that bank customers had 
no expectation of privacy in their account records maintained by their banks.212  A depositor such 
as Miller, the Court held, “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information 
will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”213  It continued:  “This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to 
a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed 
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the 
third party will not be betrayed.”214  The Court has upheld the installation of pen registers, which 
record telephone numbers dialed, for the same reason: the caller assumes the risk that the phone 
company will divulge these numbers, and therefore has no expectation of privacy in that 
information.215 This theory would encompass just about all information “voluntarily” conveyed 
to third parties in course of one’s activities.216
211
 Id. at 52.  The Court went on to hold that as to information the banks obtain from a customer “simply because the 
Government wants it” the information is sufficiently described and limited, and sufficiently related to commerce 
clause power as the withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge made by the banks.  Id. at 67.  It never reached 
depositors’ Fourth Amendment claims in this regard, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  Id. at 68.
212
 425 U.S.435 (1976).
213
 Id. at 443.
214
 Id., citing cases involving government informants being sent, without judicial authorization, to converse with 
suspects and report, record, or transmit the suspect’s statements.
215
  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical 
information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of 
business.   In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”)    
216
 Certain statutory protections now exist for personal financial records, Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§3401 (1978) (permitting depositors to challenge subpoenas for their financial records except where notifying them 
would “seriously jeopardize the investigation”), and Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §3121 
(1987) (court approval required for government access to telephone records).  It is not clear whether the existence of 
the statute would be found to create an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.  Cf. California v. 
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There are serious conceptual and practical problems with the approach, however.  
Conceptually, when applied to information supplied under some assurance of confidentiality, as 
with bank records, an individual cannot realistically be said to have assumed the risk of 
divulgence; most people’s assumption would be the opposite.  Furthermore, why should 
disclosure to one person or entity be equated with disclosure to the entire world, and particularly 
to law enforcement personnel?217  Privacy expectations do not need to be all or none, and are not 
in real life.218  After all, the fact that one opens one’s home to social guests does not mean that 
one has no expectation of privacy as against the police.219  Practically, the holdings above 
present citizens with a Hobson’s choice of participating in many of the fundaments of modern 
life or giving up the confidentiality of their personal information.  These cases might be 
described as adopting the “hermit” theory of privacy expectations: a person only has an 
expectation of privacy in what she keeps totally to herself.220
Beyond these objections, the theory falls of its own weight when applied to information 
required to be passed to the government, as would be the case if a national identity card was 
needed for certain registrations and the information was then, by statutory mandate, transmitted 
to the system’s computers. The risk of disclosure would be imposed, not assumed, and would not 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (state right to privacy in garbage left at the curb does not create a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
217
 See Brian J. Sen, Great Expectations of Privacy:  A new Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MISS. L. 
REV. 583, 604 (1989) (“Simply because individuals have, to a limited degree, exposed an activity to public view, the 
Court should not conclude that they have completely relinquished all Fourth Amendment protection.”)
218
 The Supreme Court recently acknowledged as much in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 521 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) 
(“The reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical hospital patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a 
hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”). 
219
 Indeed, not only does the homeowner retain her expectation of privacy, but her social guest may share in it.  
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
220
 Smith v. Maryland, supra note 215, at 750 (“[U]nless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has 




be a risk at all but a certainty.221  These differences distinguish the bank records and telephone 
pen register cases.222  The two requirements that information be linked to a national identity 
number and transmitted to the government for inclusion in its identity system database make all 
the difference, even if the information itself would have been generated anyway in the 
registration transaction.  In addition, many occasions for registration involve activities that are 
central to a free and full life, like education, medical care, and travel.223  Together these factors 
obviate the fictions of voluntary third-party disclosure and assumed risk, and should cause 
governmentally mandated collection and transmission of personal data to be found to be a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.224 Whether the Court would reach this conclusion is not so clear-
cut in light of its record.225
If it did conclude that such compelled data collection was a search, that finding would not 
end the inquiry.  The Court would then need to address the reasonableness of the practice.  Given 
221
 This would be analogous to Justice Marshall’s hypothetical of an official announcement that henceforth mail or 
private phone conversations would be randomly monitored, forcing citizens to “assume the risk” of government 
intrusion.  Smith, supra note 215, at 750.
222
  But official constraint on choice was not enough to save the homeowner who was compelled by ordinance to 
leave his garbage at the curb from being held to have assumed the risk that “animals, scavengers, children, and 
snoops” – along with police – would go through that garbage.  Greenwood, supra note   , at 
223
 As pointed out by Justice Marshall in dissent in Smith, supra note 215, at 749, this distinguishes the consensual 
monitoring cases on which risk assumption analysis is built, because one can certainly live a full life without 
speaking to a given individual.  In other words, talking to an unreliable auditor is truly a risk one “assumes,”  while 
engaging in these other activities is not.  On the other hand, the Court has characterized the disclosures of private 
medical information to doctors, hospitals, insurance companies and public health agencies as “an essential part of 
modern medical practice.”  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S 589, 602 (1977).
224
 In a dissent in California Bankers Assn., supra note 210, at 84, that neatly anticipates the kind of data collection 
possible in a national identity system, Justice Douglas wrote: ”It would be highly useful to governmental espionage 
to have. . . reports from all our bookstores, all our hardware and retail stores, all our drugstores.  These records [in 
addition to financial records] might be ‘useful’ in criminal investigations . . . [Doctors, lawyers, creditors, political 
allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, papers and magazines read] are all tied to one’s 
social security number; and now that we have the data banks, these other items will enrich that storehouse and make 
it possible for the bureaucrat – by pushing one button – to get in an instant the names of the [millions of] Americans 
who are subversives or potential and likely candidates.”
225
 The majority in Smith, supra note 215, at 740-41 n 5, was at least willing to entertain the possibility of using a 
“normative inquiry” rather than risk analysis to determine the applicability of the Fourth Amendment in some 
circumstances.  See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (“[since] it is the task of the law to form 
and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not . . . merely recite . . .  risks without examining the 
desirability of saddling them upon society.”) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
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what could be characterized as the non-criminal purpose of such data collection,226 the analysis 
used for other administrative searches would probably be applied.  As with regulatory seizures, 
this methodology balances “the government’s need to search against the invasion the search 
entails.”227 Using this approach the Court has upheld health and safety inspections of homes 
without any indication of individual wrongdoing, as well as a host of other suspicionless “special 
needs” searches.228
On the other hand, it has never upheld the kind of blanket invasion of personal privacy 
that the transmission of registration information into national databases would involve. While it 
is true that such personal information would be used to further important government interests,229
this practice would appear to lack many other attributes of the administrative searches the Court 
has sustained.  For example, as a novel expansion of data collection, it would not carry the “long 
history of judicial and public acceptance” that home health and safety inspections have had.230
Even though amassing personal information in comprehensive databases might ultimately 
increase their usefulness, the marginal utility is uncertain if not completely speculative.  An 
enormous amount of data about virtually every person in the United States would have to be 
collected and retained in the hope that some of it might give some hint of terrorist or other illegal 
activity.  The absolute effectiveness of terrorist profiling using a wide array of personal data has 
yet to be demonstrated.231 There can thus be no claim that no “other technique would achieve 
acceptable results.”232
226
 Cf., TAN   infra.
227
 Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
228
 Wayne Lafave, Search and Seizure
229
 See TAN  supra.
230
 Camera, 387 U.S. at 537.  In fact, on the federal level, Congress has imposed protection for data privacy in a 
number of instances.  add
231
 For an argument that this kind of data mining will be ultimately be productive, see John M. Poindexter, Finding 
the Face of Terror in Data, NY. Times A25 (September 10, 2003)((“The only way to detect . . .  terrorists is to look 
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With respect to the degree of intrusion, much would turn on how long the information 
was retained, what parties had access to it, and the purposes for which it would be used. These 
factors figured in the Court’s assessment in Whalen v. Roe of New York’s centralized filing 
system for controlled substances prescriptions, identifiable by patient name.233 Challenged by 
doctors and patients on right to privacy grounds,234 this mandatory reporting program was upheld 
by a unanimous Court.  The program contained limitations on who could access the data and 
made unauthorized disclosure a crime; no instances of unauthorized use had occurred in the first 
twenty months of the program’s operation.235 These and other features of the New York drug 
prescription library in Whalen point the way for designing a mandatory data collection system 
that could pass as a reasonable search. Limited disclosure is essential.236  Because a national 
identity system’s more extensive database would potentially be useful in civil or criminal cases, 
additional restrictions, such as barring the use of database contents in litigation in a manner akin 
to a privilege, might also be advisable.237
 In a national identity system, limiting retention of registration records would conflict 
with compiling the fullest picture of a person’s movements and activities.  Obviously, the longer 
records were retained the more complete that picture, though older data is usually less 
informative than more recent.  Record retention has surfaced as an issue in the design of CAPPS 
for patterns of activity that are based on observations from past terrorist attacks as well as estimates about how 
terrorists will adapt to our measures to avoid detection.”).
232
 Compare id; Martinez-Fuerte, supra note   , at   .
233
 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
234
 While the Court did not have before it pure Fourth Amendment claim, it rejected a Fourth Amendment based 
right to privacy argument.  Id. at 604, n. 32.
235
 Id. at 593-94, 600-01.
236
 Cf., Even a nondisclosure policy can be violated, however, as happened when JetBlue breached its own privacy 
policy and gave 5 million passenger itineraries to a defense contractor that used the information as part of a study of 
how to identify “high risk” airline customers.  Greg Schneider and Keith L. Alexander, Plan to Screen Air Travelers 
Hits Bump, WASH. POST. A13 (September 25, 2003).
237
 For example, data collected at hotel or car rental registrations could easily be relevant in a criminal conspiracy 
prosecution or even a divorce action.
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II.  At first the Department of Transportation proposed to retain data about certain individuals for 
up to 50 years.  In response to a flood of negative comments, the Department (now of Homeland 
Security) currently proposes to retain information about U.S. citizens and permanent resident 
aliens only for a matter of days after completion of travel.238  The Court in Whalen noted with 
approval that New York destroyed its stored prescription records after five years, and it seems 
likely that the shorter the retention period the more reasonable a records database will appear.
In sum, although mandatory reporting to government databases of the kind of 
“registration data” that is an incident of twenty-first century American life should be found to be 
a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, it might well pass as a reasonable one.  The outcome of 
the reasonableness balance would depend in part on the purpose of the data collection as well as 
the its effectiveness in achieving that purpose.  But even where the success rate was low, as it 
undoubtedly would be in “terrorist” profiling, restrictions on use, retention, and disclosure might 
well tip the balance toward Fourth Amendment acceptability, at least during its experimental 
phase.239
Governmental collection of registration data would also withstand Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination challenge, even if some of the information might provide a “link in the chain of 
evidence used to prosecute.” 240  Suppose, for example, a flight school was obligated to transmit 
personal data about its students, including the fact of enrollment, to a governmental database, 
238
 68 FR 45265 (August 1, 2003) (record retention for non-resident aliens is still under consideration; furthermore, 
for all persons existing government records will be retained for up to three years, or until superseded).
239
 See e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 203, at §2-9.1(d)(vi) and (vii). (recommending 
disclosure of technologically assisted physical surveillance for designated lawful purposes only and disposition of 
records no longer required).  See also case law upholding DNA collection from persons convicted of federal crimes 
under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 141350, and state analogues, United States 
v. Kincade, - F. 3d – 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 20123 (October 2, 2003) (summarizing and distinguishing cases).
240
 Hoffman, supra note 112.
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and that this data helped trigger a terrorist profile or was used in a criminal prosecution.241 The 
main answer to a Fifth Amendment objection is that the government did not “compel” 
production of the information; the person voluntarily supplied it when she registered with the 
school.242  As the Court said in Fisher v. United States, “the Fifth Amendment protects against 
compelled self-incrimination, not the disclosure of private information.”243   “It follows that the 
self-incrimination privilege is not available to a customer, patient, or client of a third party 
[required] to produce its records relating to that person.”244  Most, if not all, database material 
would probably come from third parties; if so, no Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights 
would be affected.  
Because a national identity system would probably not require an individual to report her 
own whereabouts or private activities directly to a government database, the discussion of this 
form of data collection will be fairly summary.  One reason for its unlikelihood  is that the 
permissibility of a self-reporting scheme under the Fifth Amendment is much less clear-cut than 
reporting by third parties.  An analysis of the self-incrimination issue would necessitate a choice 
between a line of cases barring self-reporting obligations which produce clearly incriminating 
communications245 and those where the likelihood of self-incrimination is less and/or the 
reporting is more directly linked to a noncriminal regulatory scheme.246  Significantly, among the 
241
 This example is meant to illustrate a “real and appreciable” likelihood of self-incrimination.  Brown v. Walker, 
161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896). But see Chavez v. Martinez, supra note 114, suggesting that no Fifth Amendment issue 
arises unless and until the compelled information is offered in a criminal prosecution.
242
 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).  
243
 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 401. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
244 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 247, n. 47 (2d. ed. 1999).
245
 Marchetti v.  United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (requiring gamblers to identify themselves and pay occupational 
tax) ; Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)(same); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (requirement 
to register illegally possessed firearm) , Albertson v. United States,  382 U.S. 70 (1965) (requiring registration of 
members of the Communist Party).
246
 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (motor vehicle accident report), Baltimore City Dept. of Soc. Services 
v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) (order to produce child).
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latter category is California v. Byers, in which the Court narrowly upheld a “hit and run” statute 
requiring any driver involved in an accident to stop and provide his or her name and address.247
The resolution of the conflict between these lines of authority would depend on the precise 
contours of the self-reporting demanded by the national identity system, as well as any 
restrictions on the information’s use.248  It is possible that self-reporting could be structured in a 
way as to avoid offending the Fifth Amendment.  Barring the information’s use in a criminal 
prosecution would certainly suffice, and would not greatly interfere with employing the 
information in profiling for further surveillance.  As a practical matter, though, self-reporting 
would surely be far less reliable and complete than mandated data reporting by third parties.  For 
those reasons alone a national identity system could not sensibly depend on individuals 
providing information about their own activities.  Avoidance of any substantial Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination problems suggests the same course.
B. Consensual Encounters, Terry Stops, Citations, and Arrests 
In contrast, data generation and collection associated with consensual encounters, stops, 
and arrests does not fall afoul of the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches, though 
for slightly different reasons in each case.
1. Consensual Encounters
247Byers, supra note 246.   In this concurrence Justice Harlan advanced an argument for rejecting a self-
incrimination challenge that resonates with proposed data collection in a national identity system:  “Technological 
progress creates an ever-expanding need for governmental information about individuals.  If the individual’s ability 
in any particular case to perceive a genuine risk of self-incrimination is to be a sufficient condition for imposition of 
use restrictions on the government in all self-reporting contexts, then the privilege threatens the capacity of the 
government to respond to societal needs with a realistic mixture of criminal sanctions and other regulatory devices.”  
Id. at 452
248
 Use for a noncriminal, regulatory purpose would certainly enhance prospects for acceptance, and that in turn, 




The same consent that prevents certain encounters from being classified as seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment should keep their attendant production of information from constituting 
searches.  Suppose, for example, a person pauses and presents her identity card in response to a 
request for that card.  Suppose, too, that data showing the card was checked at that particular 
time and place is added to the government database while her identification is being “run” 
against that database.  The database would now contain additional information about this person: 
that she was at place X at time Y and that she voluntarily presented her identity card.  It might 
very well also record the fact that her identity check showed nothing unusual.  
For two related reasons, this does not amount to a search.  First, to the extent she knew 
the workings of the system, a fairly likely possibility if a national identity system were in place, 
having voluntarily stopped and presented her identification card, she has consented to having this 
information included.  Second, even if she was unaware of its implications, here, unlike the 
registration procedures above, she has truly assumed the risk of this data collection and storage.  
The person who has viewed her card now knows her identity, and of course also knows the time 
and place the card was read.  That person is free to report, record, or transmit that information, 
and the fact that this is done surreptitiously, or electronically, has no bearing, the Court has held, 
on the individual’s expectation of privacy.249
2. Terry Stops
Investigative stops, of course, do not contain this element of consent.  The question here 
is whether the same reasonable suspicion that justifies stopping a person and demanding 
identification in the first place also justifies recording and retaining that information with a date, 
time, and location stamp.  This data collection and retention clearly adds to the imposition of a 
249
 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
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Terry stop.  Now instead of the “brief intrusion” described by the Court, the individual has a 
“brief intrusion” plus an endless record, not only of having been in a particular place at a 
particular time, but also perhaps of having generated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  
Because Terry was decided by balancing the governmental need for investigative stops against 
their degree of individual intrusion, this additional imposition upsets Terry’s balance.
It is a close question, but the Court would nevertheless probably permit this practice, for 
several reasons.  One is that the observations underlying this newly recorded data ordinarily are 
of the person in a public place, a law enforcement action not usually subject to Fourth 
Amendment regulation.250  Second, the individual is not being forced to provide any information 
beyond her identification, an incident of a Terry stop the Court has already upheld.251  The 
additional information transmitted to the database – time, place, and even the reason for the stop 
and its outcome  – is all created by the officer; in other words, there is no search involved in 
discovering these facts.  Third, access to such stored information may serve the purposes of 
investigative stops in general: confirming or dispelling the suspicion of criminality.  A person 
who claims to be “lost” in the vicinity of high-value theft targets, for example, is less believable 
if he was “lost” there before. 
 There is no question that retaining data from a stop adds to its intrusiveness when that 
data is linked to a particular person.252  This is especially true when the investigative stop does 
not lead to arrest; an individual could acquire a police “record” for activities that were not 
criminal enough to produce an arrest, much less a conviction.253  Whether that extra weight on 
250
 TAN    infra.
251
 TAN    supra.
252 Harris’ writings on data collection re: traffic stops.
253 FOIA case on arrest records. For that reason, constraints on the use of this data should be built into any system 
that collected and retained it.  See  TAN   infra.
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the Terry scale would cause the Court to bar this practice, or insist on a higher level of criminal 
probability for its use, is much less clear.
3. Traffic Citations and Arrests
Recording and storing data associated with traffic citations and arrests is 
unexceptionable.  As with Terry stops, other than the identification supplied by the suspect, the 
information would have been observed and recorded by the officer.  Moreover, here there is 
probable cause for detaining and processing the individual.  It is not possible to adjudicate traffic 
citations and arrests without collecting data about their circumstances.  The widespread practice 
of gathering and storing this data attests to its acceptance.254  Arrest records are now used for
charge, bail and sentencing decisions, and in connection with the grant of certain licenses.255
There is thus a demonstrated need for the collection and retention of arrest data, and no apparent 
Fourth Amendment objection to doing so.  This is true even though aggregation of arrest data in 
one database, or several linked ones, is qualitatively different from the maintenance of discrete 
public records in the originating jurisdictions.256
C. Checkpoints
Identification checkpoints present another opportunity for collecting, and then storing, 
information about the location of a particular individual at a particular time.  Ordinarily, official 
surveillance of a person in public, even targeted surveillance, does not amount to a search under 
254
 See e.g. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (requiring U.S. Attorney General to “acquire, collect, classify, and preserve 
identification, criminal identification, crime and other records” and make them available for official use by state and 
federal agencies).
255
 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (arrests not resulting in convictions may be considered for 
sentencing purposes); Tatum v. Rogers, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14351 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (use of arrest records by 
prosecutors and judges in charge and bail decisions and by licensing authorities).
256
 United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 
(“[T]here is vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, 
country archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information.”) (upholding Freedom of Information Act exemption for rap sheets as involving an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy).
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the Fourth Amendment.257  In United States v. Knotts the Supreme Court applied this principle to 
the tracking of a beeper that government agents had installed in a can of chloroform, a chemical 
used to manufacture methamphetamine.258  With the assistance of a monitoring device placed in 
a helicopter, agents tracked the vehicle carrying the can to a particular cabin, and included this 
discovery in a search warrant application for the cabin.  Responding to defendant’s argument that 
this was search, the Court stated, “A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,” the Court 
stated.259  It continued, “[t]he fact that the officers in this cased relied not only on visual 
surveillance, but on the use of the beeper . . . does not alter the situation.  Nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed on them at 
birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”260 In Knotts, 
then, the Court placed official surveillance of public movement, and the use of technological aids 
to do so, outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment.  No longer could a person rely on her 
wiles or the vagaries of human physical and mental abilities to preserve her public 
“anonymity.”261 Knotts, it might be said, ended the “sporting chance” age of public surveillance 
and moved us into the era of big game hunting.262
257
 The classic statement of this point comes from the majority opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967): “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”  See also Justice Harlan’s concurrence: “[O]bjects, activities, or statements that [a person] 
exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been 
exhibited.” Id. at 361.   
258
 460 U.S. 276 (1980).
259
 Id. at 281.
260
 Id. at 282.
261
 See Taslitz, supra note 192, at 143 (radio transmitter much more effective and difficult to detect than human 
observer).
262
 In Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), a majority of the Court found the use of thermal imaging to detect 
heat patterns in the home to be a search under the Fourth Amendment. That decision does not seriously undermine 
Knotts, because, as the Court emphasized repeatedly, Kyllo involved surveillance of a home, “the prototypical . . . 
area of protected privacy.”  Id. at 34.  Furthermore, Kyllo’s expectation of privacy depended also on the fact that the 
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Knotts thus poses a major obstacle to any claim that information garnered in a checkpoint 
stop would be the fruit of an unconstitutional search.  If the government can follow (or stop) 
people traveling in public, presumably it can also record what it learns.  With enough 
checkpoints, though, it could virtually track everyone’s movements.  Knotts himself raised the 
specter of “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen,” eliciting this response from the Court: 
“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices . . .  should eventually occur, there will be time 
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”263  The 
use of identification checkpoints to generate a database of individual activities would certainly 
bring that day closer, but the constitutional outcome would very much depend on the nature and 
extent of such public surveillance.  It is possible to imagine degrees of checkpoint data collection 
that would fall well within the Supreme Court’s tolerance level.
D. Summary
National identity cards could be the fulcrum for a massive exercise in government data 
collection.  At the least, the resulting databases would cause many people to experience a loss of 
privacy and a fear of the use (or misuse) of their personal information.  Whether such 
governmental collection, use, and retention of personal data would constitute an unreasonable 
search is far less certain.  As reviewed above, under present law the state can view and record a 
fair amount of publicly observable activity, and can collect data on police-citizen interactions 
that are otherwise justifiable. These instances involve few real Fourth Amendment concerns.  
Mandatory reporting of personal information raises the toughest Fourth Amendment issue 
because, this section contends, it should be regarded as a governmental search.  Nevertheless, it 
technology in question “is not in general public use.”  Id.  This is probably not the case with tracking devices, and 
certainly not the case for checkpoint surveillance and record keeping. 
263
 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84.
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is likely that some measure of collection of data that has already been generated in daily life 
would be tolerated under the case law permitting non-criminal administrative searches.  
Comprehensive restrictions, particularly on disclosure and use, as well as on the duration of 
information retention, would help this practice pass constitutional muster.  On the other hand, 
before the United States came close to becoming a “total information society” one would hope 
the Supreme Court call a halt to its previous acceptance of mandated reporting.  Just when that 
line would be crossed is impossible to predict.  Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objections 
would not arise in governmental gathering of information given to third parties.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States may never have or use a national identity card.  Since September 11, 
however, the possibility has become real enough that it is not too soon to attempt to evaluate the 
constitutionality under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the kinds of practices a national 
identity system might employ.  It would be pointless and unwise to design a system blatantly 
conflicting with these provisions.  Given the expense and effort entailed in creating any national 
identity system, costs and benefits should be evaluated at an early stage of its consideration.  To 
the extent that the constitution would stand in the way of a particular national identity card uses, 
the projected benefits will be correspondingly reduced, decreasing its overall desirability.  In 
addition, if there is going to be a national identity system, it is advisable to consider the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment issues in advance of its design so as to minimize civil liberties intrusions 
and maximize the prospects for judicial acceptance.
  This Article has attempted to indicate what those constitutional obstacles and issues 
might be, as well as what practices present little or no problem.  With respect to the Fourth 
Amendment seizures that might be implicated in official demands for an identity token, a wide 
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range of identification occasions would not present much constitutional difficulty.  These include 
demands for identification during registration procedures and during investigative and traffic 
stops and arrests, and requests for identification during consensual encounters.  There is one 
outright prohibition on official insistence on presentation of an identity card, and two important 
caveats.  Suspicionless stops to check identity cards would be unreasonable seizures.  One caveat 
concerns the use of checkpoints for terrorist profiling.  Unless extraordinary circumstances 
develop, or there is a quantum leap in the effectiveness of this technique, checkpoint stops to link 
people to a database in order to profile potential terrorists should be held to be unreasonable 
seizures.  On the other hand, checkpoints designed to identify unauthorized migrants or known 
suspects seem likely to receive judicial acceptance.  The second caveat about the design of a 
national identity system is the danger it poses for drastically increasing pretextual traffic stops of 
motorists: stops for genuine traffic violations undertaken not to enforce the law but for the 
purpose of checking identification.  This practice is lawful under the Fourth Amendment, but, in 
the absence of a wholesale reinterpretation of the pretextual stop doctrine, legislation for a 
national identity system should attempt to discourage it.  
A review of the Fourth Amendment issues in government-mandated data collection, 
retention and use shows that recording public encounters, including those in normal investigative 
stops and arrests, as well as those at checkpoints, would be unlikely to raise serious objection.  
Recording investigative stops would probably be upheld despite considerable grounds for finding 
them to upset the carefully constructed balance sustaining the constitutionality of seizures based 
upon reasonable suspicion.  Government acquisition of personal data that was already supplied in 
connection with some ordinary service poses the most serious Fourth Amendment issue.  This 
procedure should be treated as a search, but it may be a reasonable one, at least until it reaches 
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some indefinable level of societal surveillance.  Thus far the Supreme Court seems willing to 
accept a certain amount of government database creation by way of gathering information 
already in existence.  
Where this leaves the prospects for a national identity system is hard to say, particularly 
because a definitive judgment about its constitutionality can only come after its features are 
defined, and even then only the litigation necessary to resolve many of the close questions 
identified in this Article.  Clearly, the Fourth Amendment stands in the way of the kind of total 
surveillance and the anytime identification demands that would allow such a system to operate at 
maximum efficiency.  On the other hand, there is still a fair amount the government could do in 
both areas that would withstand Fourth Amendment challenge. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment 
presents no significant obstacle to the primary functions of a national identity system.  
This review of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues should serve to demonstrate to 
proponents of an identity card that there are both limits and dangers to its use.  It should also 
make clear to those who see a national identity system as an Orwellian nightmare that while the 
constitution stands somewhat athwart its path, it does not make such a system impossible.  
Whether the kind of national identity system that could operate lawfully is worth the financial, 
administrative, and social costs, would ultimately be a policy, not a legal, judgment.  Much of 
the policy assessment, though, involves a balancing of the government’s need for a national 
identity card, its effectiveness, and its imposition on privacy and free movement.  To a large 
degree, these are the same factors on which the constitutionality of a national identity system 
turns.  The legal analysis thus gives a useful window on the desirability as well as the 
constitutionality of adopting a national identity card.
7/13/2004
71
